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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR: THE FACTORS BENEATH THE INVASION 
 
Aydıntan, Mehmet Ali Emir 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Hasan Ali KARASAR 
September 2013 
 
This thesis claims that there are other factors, apart from the Soviet aggression, 
which are equally important in clarifying the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Despite the 
fact that the idea that the Soviet Union would be pleased to see a client regime in her 
neighbors is embraced, more arguments are needed to be discussed to explain such a 
large scale invasion. Soviet Union and Afghanistan had developed sincere affairs since 
1950s when the Soviet investments began to reach a substantial level. Well then, how 
this good relation deteriorated and finally resulted in an armed struggle? In fact, the 
Soviet efforts to build a socialist regime in Afghanistan bore fruit in 1978; nevertheless 
only in one year, the USSR invaded a country which put a red star in its banner and 
never posed a threat to the Soviet lands. Kremlin might have considered Afghanistan 
was a piece of cake comparing to its former military actions but the results were beyond 
the Soviet expectations. 
Key Words: Soviet Aggression, Afghanistan, Reforms, Islam 
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ÖZET 
 
SOVYET-AFGAN SAVAŞI: İŞGALİN ALTINDA YATAN SEBEPLER 
 
 
Aydıntan, Mehmet Ali Emir 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç.Dr. Hasan Ali KARASAR 
Eylül 2013 
 
 
Bu tez, Afganistan’ın Sovyet işgalinde Sovyetlerin saldırganlığı dışında başka 
faktörlerin de eşit derecede önemli olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Sovyetler Birliği’nin 
komşularından bir tanesinde yandaş bir rejim görmekten mutlu olacağı fikri kabul 
edilmekte ancak bu büyüklükte bir saldırı olgusunun açıklanmasında daha fazla görüşün 
tartışılması gerekmektedir. Sovyet yatırımlarının hissedilir şekilde artış gösterdiği 
1950’li yıllardan itibaren Sovyetler Birliği ve Afganistan samimi ilişkiler 
geliştirmişlerdir. Peki, bu iyi ilişki nasıl bozuldu ve nihayetinde silahlı bir çatışmayla 
sonuçlandı? Aslında, Sovyetlerin Afganistan’da sosyalist bir devlet inşa etme çabaları 
1978 yılında meyvesini vermişti, yine de sadece bir yıl içerisinde SSCB, bayrağına kızıl 
yıldız koyan ve asla Sovyet toprakları için bir tehdit oluşturmayan bir devleti işgal etti. 
Kremlin, önceki askeri deneyimlerinden yola çıkarak Afganistanistan’ın kolay bir lokma 
olduğunu düşünmüş olabilir; ama sonuç Sovyetler Birliği’nin beklediğinin ötesindeydi. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sovyet Saldırısı, Afganistan, Reformlar, PDPA, İslam 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Afghanistan is a land-locked country, having no serious natural resources as 
well as a very remote state from the international arena. Despite the geographical and 
economic setbacks, history of Afghanistan is enriched by internal conflicts, 
invasions, and wars. From the Alexander the Great in the ancient times to the United 
States at present day, many super powers have had warlike relations with this 
country. It is an unknown fact that whether or not the conjuncture and geographical 
location hindered the Afghans to live in a peaceful country. Whatever the reasons of 
the ill-fate experiences; agony, backwardness, illiteracy, famine, poor agricultural 
and infrastructural conditions came as heritage. 
 
As soon as the Russian advance arrived at Central Asia in the nineteenth 
century, Afghanistan became strategically important for Russia. On the other hand, 
the British apprehension stemmed from the Russian encroachment which could 
threaten her precious colony in southern Asia, namely India.
1
 Therefore both powers, 
in the late nineteenth century, reached an agreement which turned Afghanistan into a 
                                                          
1
 Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia, (London: Butler&Tanner, 1990) , 
p. 5. 
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buffer zone, between the lion and the bear.
2
 This rivalry entered into another phase 
when German presence engendered Russian and British interests in the wake of the 
First World War. Even though Imperial Russia and the Great Britain were allies, the 
Russian revolution in October 1917 fundamentally changed not only the fate of the 
World War, but also the entire Russian policies. 
 
The Russian revolution was an opportunity for a fresh start between the 
Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR)
3
 and Afghanistan, because the 
RSFSR announced that the treaties signed with Imperial Russia were null and void. 
Russian efforts devoted on igniting fire of revolution in colonial states. 
 
Having been fighting for years in various fronts, the British army was 
exhausted, but still was a part of balance of power in Central Asia. The end of the 
First World War was a golden opportunity in Central Asia where the lack of 
authority permitted the declaration of Afghan independence. However, Afghanistan 
was a poor and an underdeveloped state as well as bitterly needed foreign aid in 
certain areas. Many countries gave positive respond to the Afghan request of foreign 
aid, so a considerable size of assistance rained especially on peaceful needs of 
Afghanistan. Within those aid givers, some states became sharply pointed for the 
amount of the aid: the British, the Soviet Union, and Germany. The last was the 
                                                          
2
 Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective, (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press Publication, 1985), p. 2. 
3
 The Soviet Union was established on 30 December 1922, until it was called Russian Socialist 
Federated Soviet Republic. For more information see: Ronald G. Suny, The Soviet Experiment: 
Russia, the USSR and the successor states, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) 
3 
 
country which caused to take strict precautions as well as a temporary agreement of 
the first two states. What Nazi Germany was trying to do was to diversify the fronts 
by gaining allies from any place on earth just to increase the certainty of her victory. 
 
The Second World War transformed the world map as well as left the Soviet 
Union alone in Central Asia where the British would not be able to balance the 
Soviet presence. In fact, Soviets maintained a policy of good neighboring like giving 
long term credits, entering construction business in Afghan provinces, having trained 
the Afghan army officers and established bilateral but superficially equal relations. In 
1947, Pakistan emerged in southern Asia as a neighbor to Afghanistan. Afghan 
government hoped that the Pashtuns living in the Northwest Frontier Province, in 
other words, Pashtunistan became independent or inclined to be a part of 
Afghanistan. Thanks to the British coercive policies, Pashtuns had to choose either to 
join Pakistan or India. As a Muslim dominated region, Pashtunistan, annexed to 
Pakistan. After that time Pashtunistan issue aroused the most disputed single event 
causing hostile activities between Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
 
Afghanistan had never forgotten the Pashtunistan issue; moreover the Afghan 
governments escalated the tension which allowed subversive activities such as 
fomenting Pashtuns inside Pakistan. Sustaining venomous policies by the Afghan 
authorities impelled Pakistan to close her borders with Afghanistan. For a country, 
whose main income based on agricultural goods, a two or three days long embargo 
was enough to finish off her entire economic activities. Whenever imposition of 
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Pakistani embargoes came up as a punishment to the Afghan economy, the Soviet 
Union saved Afghanistan from bankruptcy through purchasing the Afghan 
agricultural goods before they went rotten. 
 
The United States exercised a containment policy towards USSR with Islamic 
states, so Pakistan was an indispensable part of that policy. Therefore, Afghan 
requests for the US military equipment was rejected by the US for the sake of green 
belt around the Soviets. The Soviet Union was unrivalled in Afghanistan owing to 
US foreign policy of Pakistan. Soviet policy makers were well aware of being the 
only alternative for making cooperation and developing mutual relations with 
Afghanistan. Eventually, the Soviet influence gained a momentum during 1950s. 
From building mills, bakeries to highways and passes, the Soviet Union started long 
term investments in order to rebuild Afghanistan. What is more, Afghan army was 
equipped by the Soviets, Afghan officers were dispatched to Soviet Union for 
military trainings, and many Soviet advisors were located with their families in 
Afghanistan. In 1964, a constitution was proclaimed, the following year People’s 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) which was a communist party founded in 
1965. Due to the personal interests and problems but not ideological differences, 
PDPA split into two fractions as Khalq (masses) and Parcham (banner). 
 
Public dissatisfaction due to the lack of stability, Mohammed Daoud executed 
a coup d’état and seized the power. Daoud tried to diminish the Soviet influence in 
his country to ban all political parties and forced them to join his National 
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Revolution Party, oppressed the Leftists and explored the source of money by 
looking for allies such as Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, which were not friendly to 
the USSR. Kremlin foresaw the Afghan move in such an environment that a 
Communist Afghanistan was not more than a dream, so they precipitated the 
progress of revolution by supporting the Leftists who were pro-Soviets then they 
contributed to reunification of Khalq and Parcham. 
 
On April 17, 1978, the assassination of Mir Akhbar Khyber, a prominent 
figure of the Parcham faction gave rise to mass demonstrations against the Daoud 
regime. Harsh precautions exacerbated the situation. A military revolutionary council 
claimed to cut the violence throughout the country and conduct a coup in April 1978, 
which was also called as Saur Revolution. The Revolutionary Council proclaimed 
the formation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Consequently, it was the 
first time in Afghan history a Communist government had begun to rule the country. 
Internal havoc combining with the armed struggle against Soviet interests in 
Afghanistan left no option Moscow but to conduct a military operation since the 
Afghan Communist Party was not able to control the country. 
 
After the World War II, the Soviet Union, for the first time, used military 
force to a country outside the Soviet bloc, even though mutual relations were warm 
enough. Afghan government was busy with having personal revenges but not 
ideological differences while the country was dragging into a chaos. The Islamic 
revolution in Iran awakened the Soviet cadres to move quickly before the Islamic 
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revolution would be a model for the entire Muslim Central Asia. The US was shaken 
by the Vietnam War and Watergate in domestic politics. Further, the US was busy 
with the Islamic Revolution and hostage crisis in Iran; Afghanistan was again at the 
corner of US policy priorities. What makes the Soviet-Afghan War different from the 
other contemporary conflicts is that the Soviet impact had already infiltrated to the 
Afghan government since 1950s, nevertheless the Soviets decided to invade when a 
communist party was ruling for the first time in Afghan history. 
 
Academic researches demonstrate that the aspiration of the Soviet Union in 
keeping Afghanistan as an ally is the main reason of the Soviet invasion. Rests of the 
reasons are not seriously discussed, especially by the Western authors. It can be 
asserted that the Soviet sources are highly speculative about the Soviet-Afghan War. 
Thus, in researching the reasons of the Soviet invasion, I prefer to emphasize on 
Western sources as well as to illustrate the dynamics of Afghanistan in a historical 
content. Inquiring the facts under the Soviet-Afghan War, I would like to show that 
reducing the decision of invasion into a couple of arguments only gives a general 
outlook for the war; however it is insufficient to provide a deep understanding of the 
whole story. A school of thought settled in the arguments about the Soviet invasion 
that sooner or later the Soviets would invade Afghanistan and turn it into a part of 
Soviet bloc; in other words the USSR to justify her aggression, abused the internal 
disorder in Afghanistan as a cloak. 
 
7 
 
This thesis is designed by five parts to provide a complete picture of my 
proposed thesis: the first chapter gives a concise framework of the thesis; second 
chapter analysis core idea about the Afghan people and the roots of the Anglo-
Russian rivalry. Third part discusses the further rivalry and the position of 
Afghanistan in the international community with rich literature on the relevant 
research subjects of the study. Fourth chapter presents the main argument to establish 
a framework for the study. The last chapter consists of a conclusion part which 
discusses final arguments. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
FROM CONFRONTATION WITH THE GREAT POWERS 
TO THE ROOTS OF THE INDEPENDENCE 
 
 
 Afghanistan has a rough climate in all seasons pertinent to her mountainous 
(Hindu Kush and Pamir Range) terrain.
4
 Winter conditions are harsher with the 
effects of terrestrial climate and the country suffers from drought especially in 
summers. As a landlocked country, Afghanistan (nearest seaport is Karachi Pakistan, 
almost 1.150 km. away) neighboring with China by Wakhan corridor,
5
 Iran in the 
west, Pakistan shares the longest border (2430 km) in the south, Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the north. Majority of the population can speak Pashtu 
and Dari, latter is a dialectic of Persian; despite of the fact that over many different 
languages are spoken.
6
 
                                                          
4
 Martin Ewans, Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics, (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2002), p. 3. 
5“The Wakhan Corridor is generally thought of as extending from the Afghan village of Eshkashem at 
its lower or western end to the Vakhjir Pass at the Chinese border on the east. For location, altitude 
and conditions of various Wakhan passes see the table on pages 19 - 20. At the eastern end, the border 
is divided by a westward salient of Chinese territory—one segment continuing to the northeast and the 
other to the southeast. Consequently, Afghan territory actually extends east of Vakhjir Pass on the 
north and on the south. From Eshkashem to the easternmost point of Afghanistan the distance is 
approximately 350 kilometers, whereas to the Vakhjir Pass it is only 300 kilometers. The corridor is 
widest (65 kilometers) in the middle, where it includes the Nicholas Range; it is narrowest along its 
western third, where the width is 13 - 25 kilometers except for a breadth of 30 kilometers at the 
headwaters of the north-flowing Ishtragh River. At the western entrance, the corridor is 18 kilometers 
wide.” (International Boundary Study of the Afghanistan-USSR Boundary (1983) by the US Bureau 
of Intelligence and Research)  www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/limitsinseas/IBS026.pdf  
6
 Ewans, Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics, p. 3. 
9 
 
2.1 Afghanistan and her People 
 
 According to World Health Organization (WHO), in 2009 31,412,000 people 
were living in Afghanistan with a low life expectancy: 47/50 and 1,006 dollars for a 
gross national income which makes the country officially one of the poorest 
countries in the world.
7
 Various nations exist in Afghanistan even though Pashtuns 
and Tajiks dominate the population. Pashtuns constituted % 42, Tajik % 27, Hazara 
% 9, Uzbek % 9, Aimak % 4, Turkmen % 3, Baloch % 2, and others % 4 (Kazakhs, 
Kirghiz, Pashai, Nuristani, Gujjar, Arab, Brahui and Pamiri, Qizil Bashes)
8
 
 
 Fazıl Ahmed Burget9 urges that: 
 
The data about the number of people who live in Afghanistan is mostly based 
on rough calculations. Moreover; no census of population has ever been made 
in Afghanistan. After 1964, during the post constitutional period, 
approximately 12 million people were living in Afghanistan. When the 
monarchy was overthrown in 1973, around 16 million people existed in 
Afghanistan. Although there is still a disinformation about the number of the 
people who belong to an ethnic group, Pashtun domination has always been a 
certain fact. It is true to say that there are three ethnic groups in Afghanistan: 
Tajiks (Persians), Turks (Uzbeks, Turkmen, Aimaks, Tatars, Kirghizs) and 
the Pashtuns. Pashtuns have been the ruling ethnic group since Tajiks and 
Turks who are living in Afghanistan are seen potential trouble makers with 
their connections with Iran and the Turkic world. Therefore, both the 
Russians and the British have chosen the Pashtuns the only ethnic group 
                                                          
7
 http://www.who.int/countries/afg/en/ 
8
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html 
9
 Fazıl Ahmed Burget who is an Afghan born academician has many publications on Afghanistan. 
Spending many years in Afghanistan gave him enough time for observation and analyse the facts. He 
devotes his academic career in Turkish universities (Ege and Gazi University) especially on history. 
His proficiencies at Pashtun, Dari and Turkish language enable him to reach various sources and 
perspectives. Fazıl Ahmed’s knowledge and advices on Afghan recent history enlightened me as well 
as gave me a new viewpoint. 
10 
 
creates less problem. Nowadays, distributions of population over the ethnic 
groups depend on the man who runs the Afghan Statistic Office. If the head 
of Statistic Office is Tajik oriented, he probably would try to increase the 
Tajik population by registering the other ethnic groups under Tajik 
population. For example Fazıl Ahmed is an Uzbek originated man and his 
mother tongue is Uzbek but according to his birth certificate his mother 
tongue is Dari. Afghan state reports are bias and no academic research can be 
constructed. People who are living in city centers are visible so that CIA facts 
predicate on density of province as a result of that rest of the population is 
calculated on those assumptions. Still, the date of CIA is considered to submit 
one of the most deeply analyzed facts that one can trust.
10
 
 
Roughness of the geography reflects a mirror image on Afghan society. 
Rugged mountainous terrain and continual of invasions have contributed to create 
isolated communities therefore individual loyalties like family and tribal affiliation 
become more important than the meanings of nation.
11
 Due to the lack of unity, 
independence, and conscious of being a nation; cooperation and consensus are 
appeared within a tribal level. The chiefs and the prominent families codify their 
rules in jirga,
12
, council, which has developed as an instrument of defense 
organization and harmony in tribal life.
13
 
 
Being as a highway of conquest Afghan economy has not utilized industrial 
and technological advance for that reason vast amount of economy based on 
agricultural activities. Next to agricultural activities, animal husbandry, the herding 
                                                          
10
 Interivew with Fazıl Ahmed Burget. 
11
 Harvey H. Smith, et.al. 4
th
 eds. Area Handbook For Afghanistan, (Washington D.C: US 
Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 5. 
12
 Jirga is one of the Pashtunwali institutions which is going to be explained in following pages, 
means a board of elders, an assembly, concert for conversation and consultation in a tribal way of life. 
In fact, the jirgah system is not limited to Pashtun tribes. It is universal. The Arab tribal community 
use the term of shura for such meetings and consultations. [Sherzaman, Taizi. “Jirga System in Tribal 
Life,” Cultural and Geographical Research, Vol.1, no.11 (April 2007), p. 5.] 
13
 Richard S. Newell, The Politics of Afghanistan, (London: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 25. 
11 
 
of sheep, goats and cattle absorb the largest portion of the labor force.
14
 Although 
transportation and costs stand as serious problems in front of Afghan natural sources, 
natural gas (at Sheberghan and west of Mazar-ı Sharif) and minerals like coal, beryl, 
iron, and lapis lazuli are also found in Afghanistan.
15
 
 
Again, lack of national consciousness hindered to build a modern state. For 
the Afghan tribes, the state should be out of their interests; state must only be 
responsible for protecting the national boundaries which provide stability and 
security from the foreigners.
16
 Tribal life in Afghanistan, where obedience is 
absolute, has developed its own rules, apart from the official justice system. These 
unwritten ethical codes, among the Pashtuns, design the whole social life which is 
called Pashtunwali.
17
 
 
Pashtunwali regulates the social life which consists of some sort of rules and 
expected to be obeyed by every member of the conglomerate. In the absence of a 
modern law system, those codes facilitate to maintain the order. Unwritten rules are 
taught through generations as the rate of illiteracy makes almost impossible to turn 
the rules into a modern law system. 
 
 
                                                          
14
 Newell, The Politics of Afghanistan p. 25. 
15
 Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M.Seekins, 3
th
 eds. Afghanistan: A Country Study, (Washington: 
Foreign Area Studies The American University Print, 1986), p. 22. 
16
 Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
p. 14. 
17
 Newell, The Politics of Afghanistan p. 15. 
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The most important principles are: 
 
1. Namus, honor, could be describe as which is directly related to the role of 
women, her behaviors and the results; women must be protected 
2. Nanawati means that people running from the law are allowed to seek 
refuge and shelter  
3. Tureh means men must be courage. Cowardice is perceived as the 
weakness of a person   
4. Melmastia, hospitality, involves the requirement of giving shelter and 
protection 
5. Badal, means basically revenge, the Pashtunwali allows to take revenge 
in certain conditions 
6. Sabat is loyalty to one’s family, friends and tribe 
7. Nang, honor, helps to reduce the level of violence among groups 
8. Imamdari people must behave in a moral way 
9. Isteqamat persistence in everything from study to beliefs 
10. Ghayrat gives the people to defend their property, honor, and family 
honor.
18 
 
From the first day of the modern state system has been established, it is not 
hard to interpret that central governments of Afghanistan are incapable of controlling 
the entire population where a bunch of people claim to execute their own rules. 
Besides the strength of the tribal affiliation, Islam is the most comprehensive and 
binding element among the Afghans.
19
 People tend to identify themselves in 
religious terms, such as almost all Afghans are Muslim, either Sunni or Shia. Tribal 
loyalty matters against the other tribes to obtain more power within the country; 
religious binding is a sharp weapon against the foreign invaders motivating the 
Afghans to defend their country. 
                                                          
18
Erinn Banting, Afghanistan: the People, (New York: Crabtree Publishing Company, 2003) p. 14. 
http://books.google.com.tr/books?id=fl8cd15sc7wC&lpg=PP1&dq=inauthor:%22Erinn+Banting%22
&pg=PA14&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false p.14 
19
 Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, p.14 
13 
 
Afghans were met with Islam in the seventh century by the Arab invaders and 
by the ninth century the Arabs gained more or less full control of the region where 
Islam proclaimed its triumph over Zoroastrianism.
20
 A significant role has been 
attributed to the religious leaders in an unorganized Afghan social life. Religious 
leaders, (mullah or ulema) are the primary sources of education. Moral attitudes 
especially religious activities have penetrated both in urban and rural life in a country 
where social mobility is weak.
21
 In a decentralized country which suffers, from a lack 
of systemic education, generations are grown at the hands of the religious leaders 
where skeptical perception of science and contemplating the facts do not exist. 
 
2.2 Early Confrontations Of Britain And Russia In Central Asia 
 
The first recorded invasion of Afghanistan took place in sixth century BC, 
when Darius I of Persia brought it under his control. In the following centuries, 
Sakas (Scythians), Parthians and Kushans, kept the country successively under 
control.
22
 In modern times Britain invaded Afghanistan three times to halt the 
Russian advance through Central Asia and this rivalry is also named as the Great 
Game. Nonetheless these invasions were not successful enough to build another 
India in the region. 
 
                                                          
20
 Smith, Area Handbook For Afghanistan p. 45. 
21
 Newell, The Politics of Afghanistan, p. 23. 
22
 Amalendu Misra, Afghanistan: The Labyrinth of Violence, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p. 13. 
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The Afghan State was born under the consensus of the tribes with a 
Monarchy from Durrani (also known as Abdali)
23
 tribe which was one of the most 
powerful Pashtun families under Ahmad Shah Durrani, known as the founder of 
Afghanistan, in 1747. From his era on, all of the Afghan kings were chosen from a 
specific tribe of the Pashtun clan. By the end of the eighteenth century the Durrani 
Pashtuns (Sadozai and Mohammedzai) conquered the west and north of Kandahar.
24
 
Ahmad Shah Durrani’s Afghanistan reached her largest borders in 1760s, from 
Central Asia to Delhi and from Kashmir to the Arabian Sea.
25
 Due to the internal 
upheavals and constant conflicts with formidable neighbors, large borders could not 
be preserved under Afghan dominion. Weak state organization, lack of obedience to 
the central authority and tribal tendency of the population created a short lived 
empire. 
 
Afghanistan gained international importance in the nineteenth century when 
the French and Russian had showed their appetite to the British sphere of influence 
in southern Asia. Successful French campaigns in Egypt and Syria encouraged 
Napoleon to infuse deep of Asia by training the Persian army against the Russians, 
however, in 1807, Russians defeated Persians, and under treaty of Gulistan
26
 a vast 
territory was ceded to Russia.
27
 
                                                          
23
 Ewans, Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics, p. 32. 
24
 Smith, Area Handbook For Afghanistan, p. 45. 
25
 Nyrop and Seekins. Afghanistan: A Country Study, p. 22 
26
An important agreement signed between the Russian Empire and Persia. After Napoleon's defeat, 
Russia and Britain resolved their major differences. When the Ottoman Empire also agreed to peace 
terms and stepped out of the conflict (Treaty of Bucharest, 1812), Russia concentrated more forces on 
the Caucasus and by 1813, Persia, left without allies, agreed to the terms of the Treaty of Gulistan. 
15 
 
 
In response to those activities, Britain approached Afghanistan with a treaty 
called Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1809, a mutual defense agreement with Shah Shuja,
28
 
the Amir of Afghanistan.
29
 The agreement also included securing the trade routes to 
India vital economic income of Britain. The British, in the name of protecting India, 
developed a strategy called forward policy based on creating buffer zones on the 
possible invasion routes of Russia by capturing the target territory in order to provide 
further benefit. British anxiety had risen from the Russian stable advance since 1600s 
towards India. At the beginning of the nineteenth century only 2.000 miles separated 
the two empires from each other and this kind of closeness could have brought 
catastrophic results.
30
 
 
British considered forward policy as the only way to halt the Russian 
advance. For that reason building quasi barricades seemed to be a good tactic in 
order to contain Russia. Besides, Britain claimed to enlarge her trade route through 
Central Asia, Bukhara and Khiva were chosen as the main targets of the commercial 
penetration.
31
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2.3 Anglo-Afghan Wars 
 
From the 1820s, the British had conquered most of India afterwards a 
growing apprehension began about how the Russians would react.
32
 Indian princes 
might have been encouraged by the Russian presence for cooperation against the 
Imperial Britain which would lead a possible unrest in Southern Asia. After the 
Russian victory over Iran in 1828, the first serious move came by supporting Shah of 
Iran to initiate a military campaign against Herat, the gate of western Afghanistan, a 
province that was believed historically belong to Iran. The Russians succeeded to 
convince the Persians to lead an attack on Herat, but the Afghans rebuffed their 
enemies. Although the attack was resulted in failure, the Persians did not lose the 
patience and continued the siege until the British warned the Shah of Iran the one of 
the consequences of pursuing territorial claims was the war with Britain.
33
 By 
respecting the British intimidation, Persia postponed her dreams on Herat as they 
could not afford such a devastating war even Russia would have wished such an 
opportunity to arm the Persians against her arch enemy. 
 
The adventure of Iran was part of a Russian policy to offset the British 
dominant role in Afghanistan. In 1838s, St. Petersburg dispatched an envoy, whose 
name was Vitkievitch, for promoting good relations between Russia and 
Afghanistan. However, this was evaluated by the British that the Russians were after 
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their own agenda.
34
 British insisted on the Afghans to dismiss the Russian envoy, in 
return to the British aid in lifting the siege of Herat.
35
 In the end, Britain decided to 
interfere in Afghan affairs more actively by persuading Shah Shuja, ex-king of 
Afghanistan, and Ranjit Singh, King of Sikh Empire, together to invade 
Afghanistan.
36
 In doing so, Britain would establish a friendlier regime and to 
strengthened her western frontiers. 
 
Whereas before the First Anglo-Afghan War (1838-42) had started, Dost 
Mohammad as the Amir of Afghanistan asked for British protectorate to regain 
Peshawar from the Sikhs; he promised to fight against Shah of Iran.
37
 However, 
Britain decided to support Shah Shuja not only because of Dost Mohammad’s 
connections with Russia or his persistent claims over Peshawar but also Shah Shuja 
was eager to give more concessions. Shah Shuja accepted a relatively 
disadvantageous agreement with the Sikhs which prohibited him from negotiating 
with any foreign state without the consent of British government.
38
 
 
The First Anglo-Afghan War caused a fierce reaction among the Afghans. In 
sum, the British Indian army was defeated, a force of 4.500 men and some eight 
million pounds were wasted, and pro-British Afghan Amir Shah Shuja was killed.
39
 
                                                          
34
 Ewans, Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics, p. 57. 
35
 Dupree, Afghanistan, p. 371. 
36
 Ewans, Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics, p.58. 
37
 Heathcote, The Afghan Wars 1839-1919, p. 24. 
38
 Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, (California: Stanford University Press, 
1969), p. 100. 
39
 Heathcote, The Afghan Wars 1839-1919, p. 24. 
18 
 
Within the negative results of the preemptive war, losing the chance of capturing 
Afghanistan gave the most harmful damage to the British prestige. Nevertheless, 
British retaliation came in burning of Kabul and restoration of Dost Mohammed 
Khan to the Afghan throne
40
. After exile, Dost Mohammed had mounted to 
consolidate the unification of Afghanistan taking the support of tribal chiefs to put 
down the uprisings.
41
 In response to the British military actions, late in 1839, Russia 
invaded Khanate of Khiva as a counter-move. 
 
The Russians were nervous about the possibility of British encroachment into 
their commerce a densely populated Muslim region, would turn against them. A 
mass rebellion movement in any Muslim Khanates might have been followed by the 
others in a domino effect, in the end Russia might get a profound loss in Central 
Asia. After exhausting campaigns Britain and Russia agreed on a détente in 1844, the 
same year the Russians established a base in Khiva, a step to southern Asia.
42
 On the 
other hand, British and Afghan forces expanded their lands without any clash of 
interests: British conquered large parts of northern India and Dost Mohammad 
regained Mazar-i Sharif, Khulm, Kunduz, Qataghan, Badakhshan and Qandahar.
43
 
 
With Russian support, once again, Iran started to scratch Herat issue in 1850s 
which resulted in British-Persian War.
44
 For sure, the Russians did not expect a 
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Persian triumph from the war but incessant Persian attacks had a wearisome effect on 
the British military strength. The British had to divide her forces according to threat 
perception that well suited the Russian interests. 
 
Between 1844 and 1878 Afghanistan was rather a peaceful country 
comparing to the rest of Central Asia. Annexations of Tashkent in 1865, Samarkand 
in 1868, and Bukhara in 1869 provided a vital advantage to Russia against Britain.
45
 
Prior to the annexation of Central Asian Khanates by Russia, Britain was by far the 
unique imperial power in the region; in contrast Russia had only small opportunities 
in reaching the Indian subcontinent. By conquering Bukhara, Russia not only closed 
the gap in the rivalry in Central Asia but also brought a kind of balance to the British 
presence in the region. Thoroughly, Russia became an alternative actor for the 
British dominions who wanted to enhance bargaining power against Britain or had 
hopes for independence. Significance of Bukhara emanated from her close relations 
with Afghanistan. Bukhara on the other hand, was under Russian protectorate since 
1868.
46
 Naturally, London wished to observe Russian activities and affairs of 
Bukhara from Afghanistan in order to measure either these movements were 
destructive or not. As a result, British government requested Sher Ali, successor of 
Dost Mohammad Khan, to accept a British mission in Herat.
47
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Meanwhile, a Russian mission had already been sent to Kabul under General 
Stoliatov in 1878 with a letter suggesting to sign a mutual security treaty including 
the road buildings and telegraph lines. The crucial point was the offer of stationing 
Russian troops on Afghan territory.
48
 Louis Dupree emphasized that Russians did not 
ask any permission for sending the mission and Sher Ali failed to stop the convoy 
which had already set forth.
49
 Even though Amir Sher Ali
50
 incurred a Russian fait 
accompli, he also refused to host a permanent British mission which was the main 
reason of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880) to balance the Russian 
presence. It seemed unnatural to bear the risk of a war with Britain only by accepting 
the Russian mission where in return rejecting the British. Attitude of Sher Ali 
demonstrated that he was supported by St. Petersburg and that become apparent 
when he appealed the Russians for substantial assistance. Another significant 
occurrence which had a great impact on altering the British foreign policy was the 
result of the British elections. Conservative Party (1874-80) prevailed against the 
Liberals so once again a forward policy was adopted and intensified British stance in 
Afghanistan.
51
 
 
Having dissatisfactory outcomes of diplomatic efforts, Britain appealed to a 
military option. In December 1878, a British army of 35,000 men invaded 
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Afghanistan through Khyber, Kurram and Bolan.
52
 Sher Ali left the country and 
demand help from the Russians.
53
 Russians, refused to send military aid on the 
account of difficulty of transporting troops and arms across the Hindu Kush but in 
reality they had to deal with Berlin Congress and wished no further hostility with 
Britain in Asia.
54
 
 
Second Anglo-Afghan War ended in 26 May 1879 with a treaty at 
Gandamak, an ironical place where the British army had made the last retreat from 
Kabul in 1842.
55
 Conditions of the war were also destructive for Afghanistan such 
as:  
 
…accepting the British control over the foreign policy in return for the 
promise that British troops, arms and money would be available to assist 
Mohammed Yaqub Khan, son of the former Sher Ali Khan against any 
unprovoked aggression, ceding of Kandahar and Jalalabad but keeping the 
Khyber Pass and finally British occupation forces were to be withdrawn as 
soon as the climatic and medical conditions allowed but meanwhile the 
Afghan civil governors should resume the local administration without 
British interference.
56
 
 
Second War like the first one, did not changed the British preponderance on 
Afghanistan. Even partition of Afghanistan for the sake of a more secure India was 
on the agenda. Contrary to the British plans, the partition was not realized for various 
reasons but existence of a foreign power with brutal ruling exercises created a kind 
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of xenophobia in Afghanistan. Eventually British resident, Sir Louis Cavagnari, was 
killed, as a reaction, on September 1879, just two months after his arrival, by a group 
of soldiers who assigned to protect him.
57
 After the death of British resident in 
Kabul, internal disorder was spread and the clashes between British and Afghan 
forces became a part of daily life.
58
 
 
Further occupation plans of Afghan lands were considered not to bring any 
benefit to Britain. A withdrawal scheme was about to be implemented without 
provoking the Russians for a pre-emptive attack into Afghan territory between Amu 
Darya and the Hindu Kush.
59
 Inadequacy of Sher Ali’s administration urged the 
Britain to seek a possible successor in order to maintain territorial integrity of 
Afghanistan after the British evacuation had finished. 
 
The closest nominee was Abdur Rahman, nephew of Sher Ali, grandson of 
Amir Dost Mohammed, who had spent 11 years in exile in Samarkand and Tashkent, 
and who was taking a generous stipend from governor-general and commander of the 
Russian forces in Central Asia.
60
 Abdur Rahman’s position in the country was so 
strong that British had to accept him as the Amir of Afghanistan; otherwise in the 
very act of retreating from Afghanistan the British army would be in danger. 
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Amir Abdur Rahman, Iron Amir,
61
 (1880-1901 r.) also took concessions from 
the British including a guarantee that there would be no British agents anywhere in 
his state and he would not be asked to join an anti-Russian pact; Kandahar should be 
united with the rest of Afghanistan, in return, Kandahar would remain independent 
and the territories ceded in the treaty of Gandamak would remain under British 
control.
62
 In delayed reaction, the Russians invaded Afghan held territory for the first 
time in 1885 by occupying Panjdeh a Turkmen village less than 100 miles north 
Herat which brought the powers on the brink of war.
63
 The occupation of the Pandjeh 
Oasis provoked a crisis, since the area was traditionally an Afghan territory that paid 
tribute to the governor of Herat. Britain guaranteed asylum to Afghanistan on the 
condition of controlling Afghan foreign relations in return any attack from Russia 
would be considered a threat to London.
64
 
 
In the years between 1880 and 1907, the British tried to arrive at a modus 
vivendi with Russia. At this point, British pressure had worked where the boundary 
between Afghanistan and Russia was fixed except for the line along the Amu Darya 
River.65 Actually, in the absence of British forces, the main aim of London was to 
prevent the Russian manipulations into the ethnic groups of northern Afghanistan.
66
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2.4 New Borders of Afghanistan 
 
Demarcating the eastern and southern limits of the Afghan domain finally 
settled the tense relations between Britain and Afghanistan. In November 1893, an 
earnest step was taken by Sir Mortimer Durrand, Foreign Secretary of British India 
and the founder of the Durrand Line.
67
 Mortimer Durrand persuaded the Afghans to 
sign an agreement for fixing an area approximately 1,200 miles running from 
Sinkiang to Iran.
68
 The Durrand Line was designed to bring stability to the frontier 
regions. However, the construction of the Durrand Line served at a well-known fact 
apart from fixing concrete Afghan frontiers which was to cut off a potential 
confrontation of great powers. In its final form, the line almost ignored ethnographic 
or topographic factors: tribes, sometimes villages were divided. It could be alleged 
that the line deliberately divided to create an artificial area, thus the British easily 
eliminated the raising opposition to its presence. A brilliant maneuver not only 
dragged the attentions to anywhere else but also initiated a long time standing dispute 
in the region. 
 
At first, Amir Abdur Rahman, successor to Sher Ali, refused to accept the 
limits of the line which detached many of the eastern Pashtun tribes from his 
dominations; nonetheless, an increase in his stipend from 1.2 million to 1.8 million 
rupees as well as free right to import of arms and ammunition were enough to 
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persuade Amir Abdur Rahman.
69
 Even though the border settlement was mostly 
completed, Russia did not relinquish her diplomatic and economic claims in 
Afghanistan whose foreign affairs fully were controlled by Britain. Finally, the 
Russians requested the right to establish direct relations with the Afghan government 
to settle border and other problems in 1900 culminated in new negotiation process 
over the interests of the two rival powers in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet.
70
 
 
Twentieth century did not begin so different from the last one for 
Afghanistan, just the actors and alliances were about to change. Russians had both 
internal and external matters to solve. First of all, the war with Japan in 1904-1905 
was ended with an explicit defeat and a humiliation to her military strength. 
Secondly, Tsarist government was attacked by revolutionary uprising at home. 
Following the defeat, Russia decided to base her foreign ambitions on more rational 
dynamics. 
 
By 1906 the Russians and the British were discussing partition of Central 
Asia and the Middle East. By 1907, after 18 months of negotiations, they had 
reached an agreement called: Convention of St. Petersburg. By signing the 
convention Russia agreed that Afghanistan laid outside of her sphere of influence, no 
agents would be send into the country and would confer directly with Britain on all 
matters relating to Russian-Afghan relations. Britain in return agreed neither to 
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occupy or annex any part of Afghanistan nor to interfere in the internal affairs of that 
country.
71
 
 
The Anglo-Russian Convention had failed to fulfill British hopes of settling 
the problems with Russia in Central Asia. The British were co-acting with Russia in 
Central Asia, whereas same Britain was struggling to stop Russian ambitions for the 
Straits and warm water ports.
72
 Russia and Britain were seemed to be allies when a 
greater threat had appeared to their presence than their own mutual discord.  At the 
end of the nineteenth century despite the intense Russian penetrations into 
Afghanistan Britain had still been the utmost dominant power. During the process of 
designing borders of Afghanistan, neither ethnic structure nor geographical features 
were taken into account. Britain and Russia planned everything without Afghan 
participation. Therefore, artificial state borders were created just to serve a unique 
purpose: to distinct the great powers from a direct confrontation. 
 
Insufficient financial resources thwarted to maintain the fight against the 
tribes which did not accept to unify around Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. Thus, he had 
to pursue a dependent policy to Britain. Sometimes Abdur Rahman Khan played off 
Britain and Russia against each other to secure his throne. Generally, his anxiety 
arose from the Russian offensive politics in which he was a close witness when he 
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was living in Tashkent under Russian protectorate, forced him to establish warm 
relations with Britain. 
 
Abdur Rahman’s words best describe his Russian fear: 
 
…The Russian policy of aggression is slow and steady, but firm and 
unchangeable. Their habit of forward movement resembles the habit of an 
elephant, who examines a spot thoroughly before he places his foot upon it, 
and when once he puts his weight there is no going back, and not taking 
another step in a hurry until he has put his full weight on the first foot, and 
has smashed everything that lies under it...73 
 
Abdur Rahman maintained the role of a tough ruler as well as a reformist to 
modernize the country. As a tough ruler, he was eager to control the Non-Pashtun 
tribes and other power centers. His attack on the Hazarajat which led to the massacre 
of thousands of them and the dislocation of thousands demonstrated his iron will.
74
 
He did not also hesitate to use the Islamic terms in order to gather the country under 
one rule and legitimize to his power. He blamed the great powers of being united in 
the task of destroying Afghanistan and its Muslim heritage.
75
 After his death, 
Habibullah, one of his sons assumed the throne. 
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2.5 Afghan Nationalism and the Road to Independence 
 
During the reign of Amir Habibullah Khan (1901-1919 r.), a group of people 
who educated in foreign countries like Britain, France and Turkey were to be the 
center of Afghan nationalist political movement. They were willing to transform 
Afghan tribal regime into a nation state system which had implemented in the 
success of developed states. Under the leadership of intellectual and politician 
Mahmud Tarzi (1865-1933), prime ideologue of this movement, it was assumed that 
only interpretation of modernity would be the panacea for the backwardness of 
Afghanistan. Mahmud Tarzi was an important political figure who had grown up in 
exile in the Ottoman Empire, gained, Amir Habibullah’s sympathy owing to his 
ambition in building an independent state.
76
 
 
Mahmud Tarzi embodied his ideas, combining with the experience that he 
gained during his journey to European countries and Turkey in the nationalist 
newspaper Siraj Al-Akhbar (The light of the News). Subjects in his newspaper were 
mostly about social inequalities, injustice, lack of national unity, western 
imperialism, and the ill-treatment of the Russians to the Muslims. These topics made 
the newspaper very popular among the Afghans.
77
 Mahmud Tarzi did not even 
hesitate to bring harsh criticism to Habibullah’s administration even though he was 
aware of living in an autocratic-ruled country like Afghanistan where such 
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unfavorable behaviors to the King would have bred mortal consequences. Veneration 
to Tarzi might have given him an exceptional position or a kind of courage in his 
writings; more than that two of his daughters married two of Amir Habibullah’s 
sons.
78
 
 
The editor of Siraj Al-Akhbar Mahmud Tarzi incessantly praised the Japanese 
victory over Russia and represented it as an Asian triumph over the Europeans.
79
 
Doubtlessly repercussions of the Russo-Japanese war were more far reaching than 
expected. Asian victory brought a huge question mark of Western superiority image. 
Besides, obedience to the imperial powers, independence became an alternative way 
of co-existence. Japanese modernization was a perfect model for those countries 
which aimed to be free from imperial hegemony, merged the tradition with science 
and technology, and lastly achieved economic and political progress without 
impairing national culture or discarding the monarchy.
80
 It was clear that the 
conditions of Japan were different from Afghanistan’s; still the methods could well 
be implemented for reaching the modernity, a helpful instrument in the road of 
independence. 
 
The outbreak of the World War I was the milestone of Afghan independence. 
While Mahmud Tarzi was gradually adopting an anti-British stance in his writings, 
Amir Habibullah was maintaining a policy of neutrality. The Sultan of Ottoman 
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Empire, the Caliph of the Muslim world, declared a war along with Germany in 1914 
at the same time he called on a jihad, holy war, against Entente powers. Habibullah 
Khan rejected to declare jihad by saying “…jihad must be proclaimed inside 
Afghanistan by Afghan religious leaders…”81  Still, he had to resist both internal 
pressures and the Ottoman-German attempts to provoke the anti-British activity in 
India. 
 
While negotiations were continuing between Afghanistan and a Turco-
German mission either to participate in WWI along with Turks or not in 1916, Amir 
Habibullah Khan accepted a sudden attack to the Indian border areas where Pashtun 
tribes were influential enough for creating trouble for Britain only if his army would 
be accompanied by a large Turkish army.
82
 Amir’s maneuver was to satisfy the anti-
British pro-Turkish feelings of his people, but it was enough for the Germans to 
realize that the Afghans would follow a wait and see policy in order to be sure who 
would be the victor. Otherwise any risk-taking policy might have culminated in the 
fragmentation of Afghanistan. 
 
By the end of the World War I, Russia and Britain were not acting together 
anymore. Russia was so busy with her own affairs; they had a civil war that had to be 
managed. Russian Revolution had a profound effect on the development of Afghan 
nationalism. Actually, the revolution itself did not drastically change the course of 
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events in Afghanistan. Namely, a consciously working class did not exist that 
intended to revolt against the bourgeoisie, capture the basic state administration, or 
adopt a communist style in their state organization. Honestly, there was hardly any 
reason to be inspired by the Russian Revolution for the Afghans in 1920s, therefore 
only civil war within Russia was a source of hope to find the proper time for 
independence.  
 
Britain, on the other hand, had already exhausted from fighting in various 
fronts. They profited from the Russian Civil War of 1918-1920, obtained full control 
in Near East, Persia, Afghanistan and elsewhere.
83
 As a countermove, the Bolsheviks 
announced that all the treaties that had been signed during the era of Russian Empire 
were null and void. In order to wage the civil war, the Bolsheviks supported 
nationalist liberation movements in colonial countries; hence they gave fundamental 
aid to the neighboring countries in their struggle against imperialism. As a result of 
the appeasement policy, Bolshevik leaders relinquished the lands that had once been 
claimed by the Russian Empire. Since they could not have afforded an enmity of 
Muslim population, the infant regime in St. Petersburg was vulnerable to the external 
and internal challenges.
 84
 
 
Afghanistan was then got a golden opportunity where no actor seemed to 
object her demand for independence. By the way, Amir Habibullah desired to be 
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rewarded by full independence after maintaining a policy of neutrality. Although the 
Ottoman-German pressure was so overwhelming during the war, the Afghans did not 
move against British interests in southern Asia. However, Amir’s insistence on 
refraining from British shadow at foreign relations disturbed the British. While 
Habibullah Khan was on the eve of negotiating he was mysteriously murdered on a 
haunting trip, in his sleep at Qala Gosh.
85
 
 
After Habibullah’s death in 1919, Amanullah Khan had established his 
authority with the support of army. He was a committed reformer urging his ideas of 
modernization from emancipation of women to the state administration, economic 
and social system. Entire reform package of King Amanullah was motivated by 
building a nation state in Afghanistan where national consciousness was gradually 
increasing, basic requirements were almost accomplished. In line with the efforts of 
being an independent state, King Amanullah, appealed the anti-imperialist 
Bolsheviks as they denounced that Tsarist Russian ambitions had not been followed. 
Lenin did not leave Afghanistan alone and emphasized his opinions in a letter that 
had sent to King Amanullah. 
 
Lenin wrote: 
“The Workers and Peasants Government instructs its embassy in 
Afghanistan to engage in discussions with a view to the conclusion of 
trade and other friendly agreements… (and to pursue) together with 
Afghanistan the joint struggle against the most rapacious imperialistic 
government on earth Great Britain. The Afghan people wish to 
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receive military aid against England from the Russian people. The 
Workers and Peasants Government is inclined to grant such assistance 
on the widest scale to the Afghan nation, and to repair the injustice 
done by the former government of the Russian Czars by adjusting the 
Soviet-Afghan frontier so as to add to the territory of Afghanistan at 
the expense of Russia.”86 
  
Besides economic and military aid to Afghanistan, the Bolsheviks also 
promised the return of some border regions that the Russians seized in 1885.
87
 The 
Bolsheviks inclined to create an anti-British block from countries who were 
demanding for independence in Asia, a trump card to weaken the British status. 
Thus, the Red Army could use entire force on against the White army, only 
resistance body on the road of a communist state while the British presence was 
endangered by the mutinies of the aggrieved nations. 
 
Being very determined to annul the treaty of Gandamak, Amanullah declared 
the independence. Soviet Russia was the first country who recognized the Afghan 
independence whereas the declaration was rejected by Britain.
88
 To persuade the 
British, King Amanullah sent the troops down through the Khyber Pass however the 
third war between Britain and Afghanistan would be resulted with the defeat of the 
Afghans.
89
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Suffering from the wars with considerable losses in World War I, the British 
army was literally frayed as they had no endurance for tolerating another occupation 
in southern Asia. Thus, Britain accepted the full independence of Afghanistan with 
the treaty of Rawalpindi in 1919.
90
 This was a great victory as well as an official 
recognition of Afghan independent state. A febrile energy on establishing diplomatic 
affairs spent to introduce new Afghan state was free to conduct further bilateral 
relations with other states. 
 
2.6 Soviet Russia: New State with Old Claims 
 
As soon as the Bolsheviks consolidate their power after the civil war, 
Communist Russia reclaimed the territory in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Baku 
was the first victim of the Soviets, reoccupied in April 1920; Armenia fell in 
December 1920 after a border conflict with Turkey; Georgia was the last domino 
stone in the re-conquest of the territory of the former Russian Empire.
91
 
 
Messages that had been given in the early days of the revolution such as the 
right of self-determination to the aggrieved nations of Asia and having close but 
equal relations with Kremlin were just tactics to secure the southern borders for a 
while. According to Lenin, Asian and African nationalist states could be allied 
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against Western and imperialism.
92
 Ironically, before the October 1917 Revolution, 
Lenin used almost the same words about the national and ethnic ambitions in order to 
topple down the Tsarist Russia. 
 
In the name of developing bilateral relations, the first international agreement 
of Afghanistan was signed with Soviet Russia in 1921. The treaty gave the Afghans 
trade rights with the Soviet Union and a promised subsidy about one million gold 
rubles in return for the territories in Panjdeh area which were planned to cede Russia 
or Bukhara, according to the result of plebiscite, in the nineteenth century.
93
 
Amanullah’s struggle in regaining Russian seized territories at Panjdeh was ignored 
by the Soviet Union. 
 
Despite the fact that the Afghans with the treaty of friendship in 1921 
attempted continuing diplomatic pressure to assure the independence of Bukhara and 
Khiva, both states were reconstituted as republics under the Soviet administration. In 
the meantime, the Soviet regime was recapturing the territories that had been given 
away during the Russian Civil War; in 1924, Red Army put an end to the autonomy 
of the states of Khiva (Khorezm) and Bukhara.
94
 
 
The Soviets promised that each colonial land would be free to use the right of 
self-determination or to join the Soviet Union; in practice latter was the case. One by 
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one Central Asian states were annexed to the Soviet Union, except Afghanistan as it 
was an indispensible component in fomenting the separatist movement in India. 
Meanwhile, the Soviets had serious difficulties in controlling the Basmachi 
Movement,
95
 a movement motivated by Islamic patterns with an armed struggle 
against the Soviet annexation in Central Asia. Thus, the Soviets discontinued 
establishing a communist Afghanistan and gave the ultimate priority to the 
Sovietization of Turkestan.
96
 It is clear that from the first day of the formation of the 
Soviet Union, creating a communist Afghanistan was on the agenda; however the 
conditions were not suitable to build such a satellite state. 
 
Apart from the Russian cruelty to the Basmachi Movement, Amanullah 
Khan, as a part of the Islamic World, was naturally growing sympathy to the 
Movement; moreover he sent Afghan troops to his northern frontier to secretly 
correspond with the former Young Turk, Enver Pasha who was later killed while 
fighting against the Bolsheviks.
97
 Although the Basmachi resistance continued 
during the late 1920s, it could never successfully challenge the Soviet regime as none 
of the rival Basmachi leaders had any long-lasting political programs. Lack of 
political vision and long-run ambitions, the movement was divided into pieces; it 
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survived as long as it did only because it seemed to the indigenous peoples a lesser 
evil than Bolshevik rule.
98
 
 
The Soviets demanded the withdrawal of the Afghan forces from the border 
zones (an island in the Amu Darya in 1925); in relation to this incident they received 
a declaration of non-interference from King Amanullah. At the end, border dispute 
was solved with the Treaty of Non-Aggression which was signed between 
Afghanistan and Soviet Union in 1926, contained protection of Russia and 
Afghanistan to prevent third-party nations and subversive political activities from 
using their territory.99 By signing of this treaty an air corridor was established 
between Kabul and Moscow via Tashkent
100
 thereby Afghanistan got one step closer 
to her communist ally.  
 
Afghanistan desperately needed to normalize her relations first with Britain 
and with the Soviet Union; then a world-wide recognition must be provided in order 
to facilitate the domestic reform progress, a long-term dream of King Amanullah. 
Prior to the initiation of the reforms, Afghanistan must have erased the portrait of a 
buffer zone, squeezed by two great powers.  Although the Afghans gained full 
independence after the treaty of Rawalpindi, no other state formed concrete relations 
and Afghanistan was still perceived as a buffer state between Russia and the Britain. 
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The only way to break the formulaic aspect of Afghanistan was to cultivate warm 
relations with states like France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Iran.
101
 By doing so, 
not only King Amanullah achieved large scale recognition but also he achieved to 
diminish the dependence on Russia and Britain. 
 
King Amanullah was an innovative leader but he became an adamant 
reformist after he had gone on a tour of Europe, Russia and the Middle East in 1927-
1928 with his wife Queen Sureyya.
102
 He was so influenced by the wonders that he 
had seen during the grand tour. As soon as he had finished his visit in Western 
countries, a series of administrative, economic, social and educational reforms started 
at a revolutionary pace. Leon Poullada alleged that King Amanullah’s reform 
package was one of the far reaching modernization programs ever to be attempted in 
Asia. 
 
…The pretentious reforms included the establishment of a Western-style 
constitutional monarchy, a cabinet of ministers, discouragement of the veiling 
and seclusion of women, establishment of independent judiciary, 
reorganization of central government and political parties, inauguration of 
girls’ schools, introduction of secular education and regulations in religious 
sector.
103
 
 
 
 
 The founder of Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who was one of 
the greatest sources of inspiration for King Amanullah, warned him in such a large 
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scale reform a strong and well-trained army, and a loyal and disciplined bureaucracy 
were needed.
104
 However, while Amanullah was on his grand tour, photographs of 
Queen Sureyya, unveiled and wearing Western-style dresses, at European state 
receptions, were circulated in Afghanistan.
105
 This angered the tribal and religious 
leaders eventually led the anti-modernist rebellions. 
 
King Amanullah was so determined to implement the reforms even if he had 
to crush the religious leaders who opposed the reforms. In regards to quick reform 
activities, the abolition of the role of tribal leaders in administration, and abuse of the 
Loya Jirga
106
 (Grand Council) by King Amanullah had alienated the tribal 
aristocracy.
107
 Finally, arrest of Hazrat Sahib, an influential religious leader of Shor 
Bazaar region, was the birth of the anti-reformist activities.
108
 In late 1928 Afghan 
regime started to shatter as the King’s palace and the British consulate in Jalalabad 
were burned down.
109
 Sequential outbreaks in various places in Afghanistan ended 
with the declaration of new Amir of Habibullah (Jan-Oct. 1929 r.) better known as 
Bacha Saqqao
110
 (Son of a water carrier), by the clergymen and Sufi leaders.
111
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In January 1929 King Amanullah abdicated the crown in favor of his oldest 
brother, Inayatollah Khan, escape to Italy where he died in 1960. British and the 
Soviets were worried about the spreading upheavals in Afghanistan. In particular, the 
British apprehension was constructed on if Tajik influence had increased in Afghan 
government, control over the tribes along the frontier would have been very 
difficult.
112
 Former Chief of General Staff, Nadir Khan was the most suitable 
candidate to reclaim the political power against Bacha Saqqao. Nadir Khan was from 
Mohammedzai clan a branch of Durrani, a member of a prominent Pashtun family 
cousin of folded King Amanullah as well.
113
 
 
During his command in 1919-1924, Nadir Khan suggested King Amanullah 
to put down an insurgency in Mangal tribe in Khost without using force.
114
 The 
insurgency almost consumed two years’ worth of revenues. For that reason the 
reform program was halted for several years. Having been rejected on applying 
peaceful methods, Nadir Khan resigned from his post for health reasons then was 
appointed as the ambassador to Paris where he established good relations with the 
Western countries.
115
 Popularity of Nadir Khan combining with substantial British 
support brought him to India for taking the crown back from Bacha Saqqao in 1929 
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just after two months of his ruling.
116
 Following Nadir Shah’s accession to the 
Afghan throne, the new regime in Afghanistan relaxed the quick modernist reform 
package that Amanullah introduced.  
 
Concessions were made to religious conservatives in the fields of women’s 
rights and Islamic Law as well as Muslim judges were allowed to interpret law than 
they had had before the reign of Abdur Rahman.
117
 He adopted a slower reform 
process with wider participation but this time the process was not freed from Afghan 
realities. Afghanistan improved from the civil turmoil in reign of Nadir Shah lasted 
only for several years, in 1933 he was assassinated and his young son (only nineteen 
years old) Mohammad Zahir Shah succeeded him until 1973. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
SECOND WORLD WAR & COLD WAR EFFECTS IN 
AFGHANISTAN (1953-1973) 
 
 
Political stability together with economic growth brought a visible increase of 
wealth to Afghanistan. Nadir Shah (1929-1933 r.) and his successor Zahir Shah 
(1933-1973 r.) focused on improving the army at first, then developing the 
transportation and communication infrastructure. On the account of requiring 
external assistance to actualize those goals, geographically remote nations were to be 
chosen.
118
 Lesson was learned that taking assistance from neighboring powerful 
states was not a rational choice, which resulted in enhancing external influence to the 
disadvantage of the Afghan interests. That was to say, security reasons prevailed 
thereby the far away developed nations were preferred to refrain from any bitter 
confrontation. 
 
3.1 German Interest in Afghanistan 
 
German pressure was not enough to persuade the Afghans going into World 
War I on their side. However, in the wake of the World War II, Germans took their 
chance again by meeting the very core needs of Afghanistan. Thanks to German 
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assistance in 1930s, most of the construction of school buildings, industrial and 
power facilities like factories or hydroelectric plants were completed in a fascinating 
speed. By 1938, Lufthansa put a direct flight between Berlin and Kabul; Siemens and 
Telefunken furnished telecommunications fittings.
119
 With the inclusion of foremost 
German technical advice and credits; the Western investments on business had 
largely contributed to the development of Afghanistan. 
 
Even though, the flow of multinational investment was at its climax, 
Afghanistan had still been dependent on purchasing military equipment from Britain. 
In fact, the Afghan Government incessantly requested British a guarantee against 
possible Russian aggressions; pertinent to take concrete steps. In line with this 
policy, the Afghan Prime Minister went to England in 1937 to seek a clear British 
support for the joint defense of his country.
120
 The British did not want to sign their 
signature under such a binding promise, so the Afghans received a negative response. 
 
British hesitancy was the primary factor to turn German experts into 
businessmen. In 1936 a German loan of 27 million DM was released to rearm the 
Afghan army with German equipment.
121
 As the external relations expanded in 
1930s, application of Afghanistan to the League of Nations was endorsed in 1934, 
the same year the United States accorded official recognition of Afghanistan. 
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Membership to the League of Nations would provide protection and a universal 
proof of recognition of the Afghan nation state. While Afghanistan was 
strengthening her position in international area; Western World had been in trouble 
with the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the chaotic situation of the regions where 
Britain was very influential. 
 
Structure of the League of Nations allowed applying sanctions but it was not 
capable enough to end the crises that were initiated by the aggressors. Needless to 
say, a coalition of the world nations could not able to build a peaceful world; failure 
of the system impelled the Afghans to seek assistance in case of being threatened by 
any hostile state. Afghanistan concluded the Saadabad Pact in 1937 with Turkey, 
Iran, and Iraq, first regional security umbrella which the nation has enjoyed when 
Germany started the World War II.  
 
As soon as the war began in Europe, a non-aggression pact was signed, 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, between the Nazi and the Soviets in August 1939 which 
created a shock effect on global scene. Previously, Germany and the Soviet Union, as 
two arch enemies were expected to fight each other. For that reason, mass German 
armament had been condoned by the western nations. In an Anglo-German war 
scenario, Germans might have invaded Afghanistan to reach to the heart of British 
India. British also would initiate a preemptive war as they did twice to remind the 
Afghans that they were historically designed for a buffer state. To achieve the project 
of creating a communist Afghan regime and to spread Sovietization in the region, the 
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Soviet Union would have caught in a march through Afghanistan, in line with the 
agreement of non-aggression pact with the Nazis. None of the scenarios were in 
favor of Afghanistan; in either way as surrounded by three war machines, 
technologically superior states, Afghan, had no ally to balance the other.  
 
Although King Zahir Shah issued a proclamation of neutrality at the 
beginning of the war, when there was still a large group of German non-diplomatic 
personnel resided in Afghanistan. In the meantime, the ink of the non-aggression 
pact was still dry; the Germans initiated the Operation Barbarossa, invasion of the 
Soviet Union in 1941. Afghans took a deep breath when Germany went to war with 
the Soviets since both states would be busy with each other which meant that 
Afghanistan would less occupy the international agenda. 
 
The British and the Soviets escaladed the pressure on Afghanistan. For 
expelling all non-diplomatic personnel, who were taking part in subversive activities 
against their interests, the Afghan government had hardly any other option but to 
force those people since both states had invaded and occupied Iran, a fresh example, 
after their similar demands were ignored.
122
 In the end, the World War II ended with 
the downfall of the Nazis. There was no need to worry about respecting the balance 
among Germans, Russians, and the British because a new order was established. 
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3.2 Post World War II Order and Pashtunistan Issue 
 
The actors of the new international system were less in number than the old 
one. The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics came 
up as the two representatives of two blocks. Britain was at the lowest limits of her 
power after having fought in so many fronts for a long time, the economy was almost 
in bankruptcy, human resources were voraciously consumed. Loss of British prestige 
in India and in the Muslim world demonstrated that India could not be kept under 
British dominion anymore. The best option was to withdraw without causing any 
instability after their presence. 
 
In 1947, the British government abandoned Southern Asia, proposed 
independence of India, by ratifying independence of Pakistan. Afghanistan was not 
glad to be the neighbor of newly born Muslim state who possessed Pashtun tribal 
areas (Pashtunistan). Neither India nor Afghanistan benefited from the existence of 
Pakistan which would become another source of disagreement in Southern Asia. 
 
In the absence of Britain, as a great power, to balance the growing influence 
of the Soviet Union would be a matter of apprehension. Being without a rival in 
Asia, the Soviets began to plan how to magnify their influence. Following the Soviet 
Union’s achievement on having a wide range of mobility in the region, the strategic 
importance of Afghanistan was not expired in fact a new role attributed to the 
country from the north. The emergence of the United States as the fresh economic 
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and military superpower appeared to be the only alternative to Britain in 
counterbalancing the Soviet ambitions. When the Soviet troops refused withdrawing 
from Iranian Azerbaijan in 1946, Afghan leadership hoped that the power of Great 
Britain to act as a barrier against the expanding Soviet Union would be replaced by 
that of the United States.
123
 
 
Due to the US little interest in Afghanistan, diplomatic missions were not 
exchanged until 1943.
124
 Afghanistan was evaluated by the US army experts as a 
country with no strategic importance to the United States. In 1946 Afghan request for 
US aid in repairing old irrigation dams, building new canals to increase agricultural 
production in the Hilmand River
125
 Valley was rejected on grounds of being too 
vague in economic concepts.
126
 Official inauguration of the Afghan-US relations 
started with the agreement for the construction of a dam on Hilmand River in 
southern Afghanistan between Morrison Knudsen Company of Boise, Idaho and 
Afghan government. 
 
Through the International Cooperation Administration together with the 
Import-Export Bank and Morrison-Knudsen latter spent 54 million dollars on the 
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project;
 127
 the United States had gradually become a direct supporter of the project. 
Misuse of water that had provided from the newly erected dams caused decrease of 
products as well as soil erosion that could once sustain several rotations of seasonal 
crops, became unusable.
128
 Hence the relocation programs for tribal nomads to settle 
in this farmland, such as property rights, tax privileges and small grants, were too 
weak to gain any popularity.
129
 The American involvement in Helmand Project was 
to continue for over three decades, and was finished only in late 1978, after the 
insurgency against communist regime. 
 
The British withdrawal from India raised the hopes of Afghan government 
that the Pashtuns who were living in the Northwest Frontier Province would be given 
a right to choose either to be independent or become a part of Afghanistan.
130
 
However, the British plebiscite dictated that the Pashtuns had two options: either to 
join India or Pakistan. Naturally, the Pashtuns as a Muslim nation chose to join 
Pakistan. Since the Northwestern Frontier Province was formerly part of 
Afghanistan, the Afghan claims about the Pashtun areas of Pakistan were not only 
about ethnic concerns but also on historical grounds.
131
 Pashtunistan was the main 
barrier between two independent Muslim states that in 1947 Afghanistan had 
opposed Pakistan’s membership to the United Nations on the plea that this new state 
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was occupying Afghan regions. In fact, whenever the Afghan government applied 
her aggressive nationalistic policies on Pashtunistan, Pakistan retaliated back by 
closing the frontier to Afghan trade, blocking the natural route for most Afghan 
exports and imports. 
 
Afghan insistence on Pashtunistan region also affected her relations with the 
USA. In other words, it was the main barrier in front of taking the US military aid.  
Emerging from World War II with an obsolete military force, Afghanistan had to 
modernize her army to suppress tribal revolts, to strengthen the central government’s 
authority and to possess a force of deterrence against the Soviet Union.
132
 When the 
Afghans approached the Americans for arms supplies, the US government apprised 
that the Afghan army with the US support would have fomented the Soviet Union for 
taking extra precaution which would increase the tension.
133
 The US also had 
suspicious that the American equipped Afghan army might have marched into 
Pashtunistan where they were assumed as a potential aggressor. Adding that, a 
potential US-Afghan military cooperation would irritate Pakistan in the first days of 
the Cold War in which Pakistan was perceived a key player in containing the Soviet 
Union. 
 
The Americans regarded that Iran and Pakistan were more precious for their 
grand strategy against the Soviet Union. The US ignorance of Afghanistan was not 
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only stemmed from underdeveloped infrastructure of Afghanistan, but also her poor 
relations with Iran and Pakistan.
134
 
 
3.3 Warming up the Relations between Afghanistan & USSR 
 
As a result of the uncompromised policies in every aspect, Afghanistan was 
alienated from the Western World, whereas the Afghans repeatedly applied for US 
assistance in order not to be abandoned to the Soviet mercy. Again, after a border 
clash over Pashtunistan, Pakistan blockaded the borders in 1948 bilaterally was vital 
to an economy largely dependent on exporting fresh fruits. The only alternative 
outlet was a transport route through eastern Iran which was extremely poor. Other 
one was through Soviet Central Asia, and Afghanistan's relations with the USSR 
began to warm after the Soviets helped the Afghans evade a Pakistani slowdown of 
transit trade in 1950.
135
 
 
Not so surprisingly, the Soviet Union took the advantage of the opportunities 
that were presented and, stood by the Afghans with economic and political support. 
Finally, the Soviet endeavor worked and the Afghans were driven into the Soviet 
orbit by an agreement providing duty-free transit of Afghan products through Soviet 
territory and exchange trade facilities.
136
 To create further opportunities the Soviet 
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Union was the single country, strongly and publicly supported the Afghan stance on 
the Pashtunistan issue. 
 
Afghanistan gained her independence but was not liberated from the status of 
being a buffer zone. The actors were changed but the traditional politics were the 
same and Afghanistan was closer to become a Soviet satellite more than ever. 
Twentieth century was the century that the Afghans celebrated their prolonged dream 
of independence. Nevertheless, process of breaking the chains was not smoothly 
realized. In particular, three events became the three steps of the Afghan 
independence. First a sense of nationalism had to be cultivated. 
 
The outcome of the Russo-Japanese War, which aroused the Afghan self-
confidence, grew the idea that a mighty state could yield to an Asian state. Secondly, 
noteworthy to mention, writings of Mahmud Tarzi in Siraj Al-Akhbar were very 
influential component in forming the nationalist consciousness. Third one was the 
conjuncture of the World War I that brought the dynamics together while the world 
was at war.  
 
Meanwhile, Russia had to retreat from the World War I as the revolution has 
embraced the country. Contrary to the habits of Imperial Russia, micro nationalist 
movements were supported. British on the other hand, consumed a great deal of her 
resources and exhausted of fighting for sequential four years. Primary objective was 
achieved but as soon as the Bolsheviks consolidated power, the imperial Russian 
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threat was revealed for the sake of exporting communism as a growing threat to the 
existence of independent Afghan state. 
 
As though the British and the Russians had been too puny neighbors, German 
interest to Afghanistan appeared prior to the World War II. This time German 
attempt was stronger than the first German expedition during the Great War. 
Regarding to gain the hearts, vast German investment flew in the Afghan lands. 
However, Nazi menace was overthrown by the tripartite alliance. Afterwards, Britain 
had no energy on keeping her statue of world power; they turned the title over to the 
USA. 
 
British sphere of influence comprised a huge land with many countries in 
which those were vulnerable to exploitation in case of any instability. British 
withdrawal without pointing her successor from Indian subcontinent meant that 
British blatantly handed over the entire region into the Soviet Union. Actually, 
British weakness was welcomed by the Afghan rulers just after the Second World 
War but then they perceived without Britain, there would hardly be any state to 
balance the Soviet dominance. Apparently in balancing the Soviets the only nominee 
was seemed to be the US. Afghan attitude towards Pakistan and her uncompromising 
stance at Pashtunistan issue made removed any possible US-Afghan rapprochement. 
 
Afghan nationalism reached at its peak with Pashtunistan issue; hence the 
establishment of a new born Muslim state in southern Asia, namely Pakistan, became 
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the focal point of Afghan foreign policy. Instead of finding a middle course, the US 
explicitly supported Pakistan forasmuch as there was no need for compromising to 
include Afghanistan in the Western block. There were adequate states around the 
Soviets to play with. Ignorant policies of the US in Asia left no choice for 
Afghanistan but to establish good relations with the Soviet Union. 
 
Security concerns and historical anxiety of being a buffer zone compelled the 
Afghan leaders to follow the traditional balancing policy. However, it did not work 
when the US emerged as the successor of the former British sphere of influence. 
Herein, Afghan nationalism contributed to two purposes. Afghan nationalism 
brought the independence, but later excessive nationalistic feelings hindered a 
possible alliance with the USA. Therefore, the Afghans reluctantly approached the 
Soviets at the first years of the Cold War. 
 
Imperial state system and its colonialist policies downed with the Second 
World War. It was time for a race for the ideologically motivated systems: the 
winner would set an example of a politic-economic model; the loser would be erased 
from the international scene. A coined word which perfectly described the situation 
between the two hostile poles, the Cold War, became the core determinant of the 
international politics for three decades. Early strategy of the Cold War for both 
powers was to enlarge the capacity via financial aid or military pacts. That was to 
say, if security coverage had been required, one should have declared its affiliation 
either to Western or Eastern bloc. 
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Meanwhile, Afghanistan was keen on precipitating the nation building 
process, the country desperately needed funds. Lack of financial resources, industrial 
facilities, and trained manpower were the main handicaps that labeled them as non-
profitable and backward state. It was quite impossible to reach at a modern state level 
without taking foreign aid, but it was not an easy job for a country which had no 
charm for investment. On the other hand, war time expenditures, during the Second 
World War, almost bankrupted most of the wealthy states; so several countries left, 
who could lend money to the Afghan King. Furthermore; the USA and the USSR, 
prior to the Cold War, had already declared that Afghanistan was at the corner of 
their consideration. Somehow, Afghanistan should drag the attentions of 
superpowers without blackening her nonalignment position. 
 
3.4 Reign of Daoud: Plans for Gaining Strategic Importance 
 
As an attempt, “an Afghan delegation was sent to Washington in 1949 to 
request credits more than 100 million dollars for completion of the Helmand Valley 
and related projects.”137 The result disappointed the Afghans in which the US only 
approved 21 million dollars with a high interest rate.
138
 Neither the US credit 
responded to the great expectations of Afghanistan, nor had the Soviets good news 
for a country out of Soviet bloc. 
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However, Stalin’s death in 1953 changed the climate hastily and pioneered 
the relaxation of Soviet policies specifically towards underdeveloped states outside 
the iron curtain. New administration in Politburo conceived the advantages in 
strengthening the relations with Third World countries which would offset the 
Western influence. The USSR organized the first five year economic plan of 
Afghanistan. Besides, giving advisory support, new credits, and projects were on the 
agenda of Kremlin.  
 
To increase her credibility, Afghanistan had to retouch her infamous 
reputation of being a tribal state. The best way was to establish a parliament to 
explain the world that tribal state was evolving. In this manner, democratic 
experiment brought a Liberal Parliament to Afghanistan in 1949, which designed to 
form the political parties, freedom of speech and press. Thus, as soon as some of the 
newspapers like Watan (Homeland), Nida-yi Khaq (Voice of the People) and Angar 
(Burning Embers) mushroomed, objection to the ill-management of the ministers, 
budgetary and the system of the elections arrived at country wide.
139
 Primarily, 
Liberals gathered around Wikh-i Zalmaiyan (Awakened Youth Movement) which 
was an anti-imperialist movement consisted of the intellectuals and the students from 
Kabul University.
140
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Developments towards a more democratic system were seen as a threat by the 
ruling elite who had broad authority to abuse. Growing critiques, led by the above 
mentioned newspapers, were threatening the positions of the cabinet and even the 
King. Not so surprisingly, Afghan government decided to take strict precautions 
against the liberals; a ban was implemented on the opposing newspapers. Situation in 
Afghanistan was deteriorated with the combination of economic problems, mostly 
related to Pakistan. Whenever the Pakistani authorities closed the borders the Afghan 
economy, heavily dependent on exporting fresh agricultural goods, was terribly hit. 
Plus, course of the events in the Pashtunistan issue flourished to the disadvantageous 
of Afghanistan. Literally too, there was no single country supported the Afghan 
claims. Again, being isolated in her policies in 1953, the Afghan government had 
nothing to do but to resign.  
 
Drastic changes had also outburst in the same year (1953) within the Afghan 
ruling circles. The younger members of the royal family challenged the domination 
of the king’s surviving uncles, namely Shah Mahmud and Shah Wali.141 During the 
family crisis Zahir Shah, the king of Afghanistan, associated with Sardar Mohammad 
Daoud, the former war minister, Lieutenant General, ex-ambassador to Paris, head of 
the police and commander of the Kabul central armed forces, first cousin and 
nephew of assassinated King Nader Shah,
142
 to obtain the power. The forty-three-
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year-old Mohammed Daoud became the prime minister of Afghanistan; in return 
King Zahir Shah got rid of his opponents.  
 
Mohammad Daoud Khan barely experienced all critical positions in state 
administration. He was a hope for the people who were eager to transform the 
country into a modern nation and a hope for the political prisoners who were 
sentenced to prisons owing to their reformist activities during the post Second World 
War era. He kept his promise during the first days of his reign on condition that if 
those prisoners would not have participated in opposition against the regime.
143
 
 
It was clear that dealing with internal opposition, launching a reform 
program, and maintaining an uncompromised foreign policy on Pashtunistan could 
not work together. To achieve all these aims, reorganization of economy must be the 
first mission. An economic system must be settled which would not suffer from the 
punishments of Pakistan. The state income must be enriched by industrial facilities, 
mining business, and technological advancements in order to provide a self-sufficient 
state. Before that, Daoud had to sacrifice some of his reform packages in favor of a 
stable economy. Once the dependency of agriculture was decreased, Daoud believed 
that most of the fundamental problems of Afghanistan could be solved. 
 
In accordance with Daoud’s foreign policy, on 27 January 1954, just four 
months after he had seized power, the first Soviet-Afghan agreement was announced 
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when the US was planning to arm Pakistan.
144
 The Soviets agreed to lend 3.5 million 
dollars credit for the construction of two grain silos, a four mill, and a bakery.
145
 This 
was the first agreement for the Soviets had given such a considerable amount of 
money since the death of Stalin who had no habit of helping the neutral nations. The 
aid-giving era to Afghanistan was started by the Soviet Union: an easy path to the 
nonaligned nations. 
 
As a sign of Soviet sincerity, agreements with Afghanistan followed one after 
another. “The construction of gasoline pipeline in July 1954 across the Amu Darya 
including three gasoline storage centers and the two million dollars’ worth road 
building equipment” 146 were some of initiative programs by the Soviets. Soviet 
assistance also brought the Czech and East German credits to Afghanistan; thereby 
five million dollars to build three cement plants in 1954 came as the first East 
European aid to the Third World.
147
 
 
3.5 Growing Soviet Interest in Afghanistan 
  
While Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud was on the honeymoon with his 
communist friends; he had still a desire to approach the Americans for not being a 
hopeless client of the USSR. “In October 1954 Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud 
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sent his brother to Washington to make appeal to Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles for military assistance”148; nevertheless the US had no intention to have arms 
dealing business with Afghanistan.
149
 Despite the fact that Russian historical claims 
still created suspicious among the Afghans, pragmatic concerns prevailed. Thus, 
being without any alternative, the Afghans turned for the Soviet aid. 
 
Again in 1954, a conflict occurred in Bajaur, tribal territory north of 
Peshawar that borders on Kunar Province of Afghanistan to the west, between 
Afghan and Pakistani troops, where the Pakistan army used the equipment that had 
been bought from the USA against Afghan soldiers. Albeit, the US government 
protested the Pakistani government for using the US weapons against Afghanistan, 
Ayub Khan,
150
 the President of Pakistan, rejected the protest in a public speech.
151
 
The Afghan frustration against the USA did not only stemmed from her ignorant 
attitude towards Afghan development programs but also US backed Pakistan was 
exercising aggressive politics regardless of the warnings.
152
 
 
In December 1955, Prime Minister Bulganin and Premier Khrushchev went 
to Afghanistan; in accordance with the peaceful coexistence policy which was the 
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first high-ranking official visit ever graced the Afghans. During the visit, a large 
scale economic assistance was released adding to the modernization of the Afghan 
army with T-34 tanks, MIG-17 jets
153
: the Soviets granted 100 million dollars 
credits, some of it for military aid and the rest for development projects highways, 
bridges the Bagram airport in the north of Kabul
154
, and the Salang Pass tunnel.
155
 
 
The main purpose of the Soviet leaders, after returning their famous India 
tour was to halt Afghanistan from being a part of the Baghdad Pact which was a 
Western product for preventing communist incursions.
156
 For that reason, the Soviets 
showed utmost will by declaring that the Afghans had some sort of rights on 
Pashtunistan issue. A critic move remained the Afghans that they had found a 
substantial ally to maintain their prolonged claim on Pashtunistan. In his speech, 
Bulganin told “We sympathize with Afghanistan’s policy on the Pashtunistan issue. 
The Soviet Union stands for a just settlement of the Pashtunistan question which can 
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be properly solved only if the vital interests of the peoples inhabiting Pashtunistan 
are taken into account.”157 Bulganin wholeheartedly supported the Afghan demands 
for “an impartial plebiscite” in the Pashtun areas of Pakistan158 which thwarted 
Afghanistan from falling into Western defense agreements network. 
 
Soviet economic aid combining with the reorganization of the Afghan army 
brought new challenges to the Afghan bitarafi
159
 policy. Kremlin started to dispatch 
Soviet experts and troops in order to train the Afghan soldiers in using the 
sophisticated military materials. In return, some of the Afghan officers were sent to 
war academies in the USSR. As a result of the cultural interaction, Soviet way of life 
and ideas influenced the young Afghan officers who would later take part in state 
administration. The Soviets caught an opportunity for propagating their regime 
among the Afghans to build a Soviet style administration in Afghanistan. It seemed 
an expected situation in an environment where the Eastern and Western sides 
yearned for gaining new allies. If the US had been more enthusiastic than the 
Soviets, there would have been a bunch of Afghan officers who lived for the 
American dream. 
 
Growing Soviet influence, in various fields, was the breaking point for the 
US policy makers to initiate a countermove. Military pacts and economic aids were 
working well in Asia, but geographical containment policy required a wider umbrella 
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to limit the Communist ideology, so in that point Afghanistan became one of the key 
states or in other words Afghanistan was not a state of having little or no importance 
to the US interests anymore. The rule of the Cold War dictated that if a non aligned 
nation had been dominated by one block the other would try to decrease the effect of 
its rival, because losing an impartial state meant losing the prestige. As a matter of 
fact, the US joined the race of rebuilding Afghanistan which included construction of 
highways, airports, tunnels, and dams. 
 
At first, the US assistance concentrated on agricultural goods. The United 
States donated one hundred thirty thousand tons of wheat to Afghanistan in the 
period of 1956-1959, under the agreement of US Food Aid Program.
160
 Then, the US 
started to invest in educational programs: scholarship to Afghan students at 
American universities and projects to expand-upgrade the local educational services. 
Progressive US technical and advisory assistance reached an annual rate of 15 
million dollars that had given to the Afghan government by the end of 1950s.
161
 
 
In the meantime, the Afghans asked for an American assistance in building a 
new transit route through Iran to the port of Chahbahar on the Persian Gulf
162
 since 
Pakistan formed “closing borders” as a habit in any case of conflict. Iran and the 
United States announced that there was no way for viability of the project since 
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3.600 miles of new roads had to be constructed.
163
 Having been rejected by the US 
on transit route project, Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud went on cooperation with 
the USSR and renewed 1950 transit agreement for five years.
164
 
 
Different from Amanullah, Mohammed Serdar Daoud was a self-possessed 
leader in maintaining the internal order. He was pushing forward the modernization 
program simultaneously; each reform packages were under scrutiny if those reforms 
were against the religious law or not.
165
 He increased the control over the tribes, and 
sublimated the forcible collection of land taxes in 1959. 
 
Once, Mohammed Doaud’s advisers had concluded that purdah166 for the 
women was not a compulsory in Islamic law, members of the royal family, including 
Daoud, high-ranking civilian and military bureaucrats’ wives and daughters appeared 
unveiled during the ceremonies to celebrate the 40
th
 anniversary of Afghan 
independence in August 1959.
167
  Daoud's modernization policies antagonized the 
opposition which consisted of the conservatives and nationalists from rural areas. 
Mohammed Daoud did not ban the purdah as he was smart enough not to galvanize 
the extremists. When the resentment to his reforms began to arouse, as a matter of 
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precaution, Mohammed Daoud arrested the Islamic mullahs from countryside who 
were forerunners in slowing down the speed of modernization.
168
 
 
By the way, Pakistan continued her aggressive foreign policy against 
Afghanistan, by conducting military operations in Baluchistan. In September 1960, 
an armed clash occurred between Pakistan and Afghan armies that cut the diplomatic 
relations again.
169
 Furthermore, Pakistan, third time in eleven years, had closed the 
borders for two years. When Afghanistan was on the verge of a substantial economic 
crisis, the Soviets curtailed the effects of economic distress by giving an airlift to the 
Afghan agricultural goods. If the agricultural goods had been waited for certain of 
period they would have been rotten. Soviet Union which had a very bureaucratic and 
awkward structure in decision making process, astonishingly moved so fast to rescue 
the goods before they were perished. Soviet asylum intensified with an offer, a 
totally $450 million, to finance the entire second five year plan (1960-1965) if only 
“the Soviet advisers placed at the highest level in all Afghan ministries.”170 
 
Mohammed Daoud must have known that the Soviet assistance, mostly saved 
the Afghans from falling into bankruptcy, did not just for supporting a non aligned 
state which confronted with a Western backed enemy, Pakistan. Since there was no 
unreturned help in interstate relations, especially in the heydays of the Cold War, the 
Soviet Union wanted to inject the Soviet notion in Afghan administration as a 
                                                          
168
 Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History From the Alexander the Great to the Fall of the 
Taliban, (Cambridge, MA: Capo Press, 2002), p. 227. 
169
 Payind, “Soviet-Afghan Relations From Cooperation to Occupation,” p. 113. 
170
 Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, p. 27. 
65 
 
payback to the Soviet comradeship during the very hard times of Afghanistan. 
Installing Soviet advisers to the Afghan ministries would turn the country into a 
complete client regime so that Mohammed Daoud gently turned down the offer. 
 
In searching alternative trade routes, Afghanistan signed a transit agreement 
with Iran in 1962, which ran from the port of Khurramshahr, on the Persian Gulf, by 
rail to Tehran and Mashad and from there by truck to Herat.
171
 As the Pakistani 
embargo was continuing in 1962, not only Soviets helped Afghanistan by giving an 
airlift to the Afghan exports, which were to be shipped to India, but also the United 
States provided ten cargo flights to India, a week for forty weeks, at no cost to the 
Afghans.
172
 
 
Even though abundance of Soviet aid to Afghanistan made possible to handle 
the border disputes with Pakistan, Afghanistan harshly suffered from her backward 
economic conditions. In addition to the economic difficulties, Mohammed Daoud’s 
commitment on Pashtunistan issue brought the country on the brink of war in several 
times. According to Abdel Samad Ghaus, deputy foreign minister of Afghanistan 
under Prime Minister Daoud, “gaining the support of the Soviets on Pashtunistan, 
brought no practical progress or any further achievements.”173 
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King Zahir Shah must have seen the worsening situation in the country that 
he stepped in to break the opposition bloc that Daoud’s policies had created. In 1962, 
King Zahir Shah was trying to find a solution by establishing a face to face relation 
with influential tribal leaders.
174
 First, Afghan-Pakistani border dispute had to be 
solved immediately in which both states seriously losing money. However, in order 
to restore the relations, either Pakistan or Afghanistan must compromise in their 
Pashtunistan politics. There seemed two options either Mohammed Daoud or Ayub 
Khan, the president of Pakistan, retreated from their staunch politics. 
As well as having loyalty to the King, Mohammed Daoud was the most 
significant figure in decision making process. However, he was not the ultimate man. 
Ayub Khan was the supreme leader of Pakistan and there was no need to discuss his 
decisions. It was quite understandable that King Zahir Shah who was willing to find 
a solution to the mortified relations with Pakistan, requested the resignation of Prime 
Minister Mohammad Daoud in March 1963. Mohammed Daoud peacefully stepped 
down from his office, made no trouble, and did not abuse his position against the 
King. 
 
Finally, border dispute with Pakistan was solved then the gates were 
reopened. Later on, settling down the border dispute cut down the political and 
military confrontation which provided a more prestigious place to Afghanistan in 
international community. Now, King Zahir Shah had the power to take steps towards 
a modern state with a set of written rules which regulated the frame of Afghanistan. 
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3.6 New Constitution of Afghanistan and Establishment of the Political Parties                                                                                                                                                      
 
After King Zahir Shah dismissed Daoud Khan smoothly, he proclaimed a 
new constitution, Assasi Qanun, in 1964 which consisted of 128 articles and eleven 
titles. The constitution started with “In the name of God, the almighty and the just” 
and recognized “the Islam is the sacred religion with the provisions of Hanafi 
Doctrine.”175 King had the right to appoint prime minister, judges, chief justice and 
justices of the Supreme Court high-rank civil and military officials.
176
 
When the constitution of 1964 is well analyzed, one can realize that freedom 
of communication, freedom of thought, inviolability of property and dignity of 
human being are actually the basic pillars of a modern constitution. By the way, what 
made the constitution less effective were the King’s excessive rights and his strict 
control over the vital state organs. Nevertheless, new constitution recognized no legal 
limitation to the power of tribal and religious leaders. Adding that neither in 
economic nor in political life a role was attributed to women. The Afghan 
constitution might have satisfied the monarchy but it was not more than an attempt to 
fortify the will of the King. 
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Two bodies established by the Constitution of 1964: a new legislative 
council, Wolesi Jirga
177
 (House of People) and political parties. The latter was 
established even though the constitution did not promulgate the “law of political 
parties” and the “provincial assemblies’ law”178 which were sine qua non for the 
political reforms, new parties established.  
 
Four parties namely, Hezb-e dimūkrātĩk-e Khalq-e Afghānistān (Peoples 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan), Hezb-i Islami (Islamic Party), Shola-ye Jawed, a 
pro-Chinese party (Eternal Flame Party) and Afghan Mellat (Afghan Nation Party) 
represented four main political trends in Afghanistan.
179
 
 
1) The conservatives, made up of the ruling elite, religious elements, 
and the business elite, who were mainly interested in maintaining 
the status quo. 
2) The liberals or social democrats, consisting of the westernized 
upper class and some sections of the middle class, who favored a 
reformist approach and a mixed economy. 
3) Leftists, mainly drawn from the educated middle class, and the 
Setem-e-Meli (splinter radical group), who worked for a socialist 
revolution. 
4) The fundamentalist groups, made up of some sections of the 
educated middle and the lower middle classes, who worked for an 
Islamic revival.
180
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Within those political parties, the PDPA which was founded by Nur 
Mohammad Taraki
181
, (general secretary of the party), Babrak Karmal and 
Hafizullah Amin in 1965, a pro-Soviet party in line with Marxist-Leninist ideology, 
virtually by alone dominated the Afghan political history for three decades. Nur 
Mohammad Taraki had such a great responsibility to prepare the party for the 
upcoming elections in September 1965, nine months after PDPA had officially 
formed. Naturally, the party could not be able to organize to reach the masses, but 
won three seats in the parliament. 
 
One might know that three seats (Babrak Karmal, Nur Ahmed Nur and 
Faizan) in the Wolesi Jirgah that was valued as a failure in the wake of growing 
Soviet influence on Afghan political life. In this context, Taraki and Karmal’s 
Moscow visit, in the eve of the Afghan parliamentary elections, indicated that the 
PDPA was seeking a Soviet hand to have better results in the elections. Anwar 
asserted that during the visit “a collection of Taraki’s short stories Zindigi-i-Nau 
(New Life) was published in Moscow and smuggled to Afghanistan.”182 Another 
proof of trying to acquire the Soviet support was that the PDPA cadres compelled the 
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party members to learn Marxism-Leninism and encouraged them to establish friendly 
relations with the Soviet Union.
183
 
 
King Zahir Shah appointed Mohammed Yousuf as prime minister in October 
1965 just after the parliamentary elections, not so soon, criticisms raised against his 
cabinet for corruption and nepotism.
184
 On 24 October 1965, a group of students 
burst into Parliament, occupied the members’ seats and the following day the 
demonstrations resulted in several killings of activists by the gun fires of Afghan 
troops.
185
 Bitter events had finished the Prime Minister Mohammed Yousuf’s career 
and he was replaced by Mohammad Hashim Maiwandal. Prior to his resignation a 
press law was endorsed in 1966 which allowed publishing newspapers. 
 
In April 1966, Khalq (the people) started its publication by harboring the 
Soviet ideology. But the radical and anti-constitutional discourse earned a notorious 
name “subversive journal”186 to Khalq newspaper. Maiwandal’s response against the 
newspaper was to exercise an immediate ban. In 1967, the PDPA, mostly related to 
the methodological and ideological differences, split into two pieces: Khalq (same 
name of the newspaper) headed by Nur Mohammed Taraki and Parcham (Banner or 
Flag) under Babral Karmal.
187
 Two founding members of the party had also personal 
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disagreements “Nur Mohammad Taraki came from a lower-class, rural orientated 
background, while Babrak Karmal had many friends and relatives in upper-middle 
class,”188 
 
One of the causes of the rift was the question of how to react against the ban 
on Khalqi newspaper. As a result of the opposition, Babrak Karmal acquired a legal 
permission for publishing the Parchamis in July 1968 under the press law.
189
 In fact, 
both wings were in favor of giving a self-determination right,
190
 but with different 
intentions. Khalqis defended a workable autonomy for the nationalities inside 
Pakistan; whereas Parchamis perceived the self-determination as a first step for the 
annexation Pashtunistan to Afghanistan.
191
  Needless to say, Parchamis stance and 
the way they approached to the problems were more nation-oriented than the 
Khalqis. 
 
By expressing their “loyalty to the King,”192 Babrak Karmal’s Parcham 
group aimed to stay within the constitutional system. Hence they were willing to 
create a democratic national front. It could be inferred that their image of being 
Marxist-Leninist line was just a tool to realize the needs of the Afghans. On the 
contrary, Khalqi supporters purely devoted their ideas on Soviet doctrine. That is 
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why; Nur Mohammed Taraki rejected to be a part of the existing order as he believed 
in Red Revolution. 
 
Since both parts were unsuccessful to obtain rural support, they could only 
organize in major cities. Plus, in those areas Khalq outnumbered than Parcham.
193
 
Illiterate and conservative rural life hindered most of the population to interfere in 
current politics. Khalq and Parcham’s close ties among high level military ranks 
allowed an easy but illegal access to power for controlling the majority. When the 
winds of Marxism blew at full speed in Afghanistan, some Islamic organizations 
were born in 1967, both as a reaction to the Soviet growing influence and the 
secularization of Afghan society.
194
 Members of the Islamic organizations were 
students and university professors including Ghulam M. Niazi, Professor Abdul 
Rasool Sayyaf, Dr. Saeed M. Musa Tawana, and Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani.
195
 
Those people were the people who opposed losing the prestige and power of Islamic 
principles in a changing political climate. 
 
Among Islamist activists Jamiati Islami
196
 became a significant organization 
since some of the members were inspired by the other Islamist groups from different 
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countries like Egypt and Pakistan. Modern interpretation of Islam encouraged the 
members of Jamiati Islami to build a political system which based on reorganizing 
the Afghan social life according to the Islamic principles. Political views of the 
Islamist activists were not only inspired by the middle class values, but also by the 
socialist ideas that spread throughout Afghanistan, especially after the PDPA had 
been formed.
197
 
 
The first serious attempt to organize the students at Kabul University who 
had great concern in Islamic way of life was Jawanan-i-Musalman (Muslim 
Youth).
198
 The Jawanan-i-Musalman was the cradle for the Islamist groups such as 
Hizb-i-Islami, Jamiat-i-Islami and Ittihad-i-Islami
199
 some members would later 
become the legendary figures of Afghan resistance, like Gulbadeen Hikmatyar, 
Ahmad Shah Masood and Burhanuddin Rabbani. However, unlike the Leftist 
activities, Islamic organizations compelled the Afghan government to take strict 
measurements, caused a sharp fall of the Islamic parties popularity. Eventually, 
people who had sympathy for Islamic organizations became radicalized and was 
forced to maintain underground activities. 
 
Student activities and internal conflicts together overloaded the Maiwandal’s 
cabinet. Prime Minister Maiwandal, according to his health problems, resigned from 
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his post in 1967. Afterwards, his foreign minister Nur Mohammad Etemadi was 
appointed by the King Zahir Shah as the new Prime Minister of Afghanistan. 
However, none of the precautions were enough to stop the student demonstrations. 
Left wing students were blaming the cabinet for the situation that they were in. What 
is more, they demanded “greater student political rights and the relaxation of 
academic standards.”200 
 
Nonetheless, tension between Islamic and Leftist radicals was so escalated 
that the government had to implement a compulsory break at the Kabul University 
for six months in 1971. Afghanistan was dragging into a bitter confrontation without 
any obvious external intervention that the mullahs were threatening “the women who 
appeared on public without a veil would be sprayed acid on their face and when they 
wore stockings, they shot at their legs with guns with silencers.”201 Etemadi could 
stand the chaotic situation for four years and eventually he resigned in 1971. 
 
3.7 Afghanistan Losing Her Worldwide Importance 
 
Deterioration further stiffened as the importance of Afghanistan was 
diminishing due to the other serious problems that the world had to deal with. US 
involvement in Vietnam War became the major foreign policy and military objective. 
As the Americans were fighting against the Communist Vietcong, the money which 
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was reserved for the Afghans was melting down. The Vietnam War almost cut the 
US supplies, one of the great contributors to needs of Afghanistan as well as a vital 
element for balancing the Soviet influence. Hence, the US policy that had been 
implemented during 1970s rejected further assistance programs to the foreign 
countries. U.S grants and loans fell from 387,900,000 dollars (before 1967) to 
1,440,000 (aid between 1969 and 1970).
202
 
 
The Soviet Union had also serious problems: supporting the Vietcong against 
the US was an important item in the budget, China stood as an alternative communist 
system, and the Cold War rivalry became intense in the Middle East. They had to 
diversify their resources therefore another dramatic fall was seen for the Soviet aids 
from 44.7 million dollars in 1967-68, to 30.5 million in 1968-69, to 28.4 million in 
1969-70.
203
 Adding that, the Soviet Union was planning to approach Middle Eastern 
states and China seemed as a rising threat to her unique communist system. 
Nevertheless, the USSR which absorbed %40 percent of Afghanistan’s exports 
became the dominant actor by 1970.
204
 
 
Foreign investment and foreign money were the core dynamics of the 
underdeveloped Afghan economy. For almost two decades, the Afghan governments 
were trying to create a wealthy modern state with technological industrial facilities 
and a good export rate in spite of the fact that there was not a general agreement 
                                                          
202
 Newell, The Politics of Afghanistan, p. 144. 
203
 Newell, The Politics of Afghanistan, p. 144. 
204
 Girardet, Afghanistan: The Soviet War, p. 94. 
76 
 
among the people whether the democratic monarchy was a proper system or not. 
Especially, the students had a firm enthusiasm on state administration. In relation 
with the economic setbacks, the educated people were having difficulties in finding 
proper jobs. The system produced educated surpluses at both the university and 
secondary school levels.
205
 During 1960-1970s, university education brought about a 
literate mass better to describe “educated elite” embraced different political ideas. In 
such an environment, the Islamists and Leftists founded many followers within the 
students who were not only interested in political life but also were willing to change 
the system. 
 
Building an educated class was the Afghan governments’ project in order to 
be liberated from backwardness and compete with the neighboring states. True to 
say, the claim of the educated class was far reaching than the expected. New 
generation demanded to share power with the ruling elite. Since there was a sharp 
ideological distinction among those young people, they could not develop a strategy 
to obtain what they wanted. Besides, the tones of the demonstrations were containing 
violence so that the police did not hesitate to use disproportional force to rebuff. 
 
The constitutional monarchy was exhausted by engaging economic 
difficulties and internal upheavals. Although Afghanistan was trying hard to establish 
strong economy by inviting Western and Eastern technologies, decreasing foreign 
funds and dependency of agricultural products made almost impossible to run the 
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country. Furthermore, student demonstration was another factor which divided the 
country into ideological camps. When the Afghan government was struggling to 
stabilize the country, a terrible incident occurred. In 1970, a famine in which up to 
500,000 people died of starvation hit the country. According to Rasanayagam “the 
number of deaths during the famine of 1971-72 was variously estimated at between 
50.000 and half a million, with the poorest regions, such as the highlands of the 
Hazarajat.”206 As those events were thought together, the cabinet or even any 
Kingdom could not keep their possession; therefore Afghanistan was seeking a fresh 
blood to recover. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE SOVIET INVASION: INVADED OR INVITED? 
 
 
During 1963-1973, Afghanistan was almost “legally” reconstructed with the 
introduction of a new constitution and a set of rules which regulated the social, 
economic, and daily life. However, efforts for building a more democratic 
Afghanistan had not worked well during the constitutional period; even the King 
himself was threatened by the mass demonstrations, organized by student groups. 
King Zahir Shah could neither find a perpetual solution to the parliamentary 
deadlocks nor was he successful to become the source for the unity. His “cutting the 
linkage between the royal family and governance”207 policy left him alone in the 
state administration. 
 
As the situation was deteriorated, Soviet Premier Nikolai Podgorny visited 
Afghanistan in May 1973 to make an important point to the Soviet Collective 
Security System
208
 (SCSS) when the Soviet military aids fell %60 since 1969.
209
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Persistently, Kremlin wished to see Afghanistan under her security umbrella 
otherwise, nonalignment policy of Afghanistan did not meet the Soviet interests. 
Naturally, Premier Podgorny was sent there to represent Leonid Brezhnev’s demands 
for joining the SCSS but the Afghan Prime Minister Mohammed Musa Shafiq 
politely turn down the offer as the system was essentially directed against China.
210
 
 
In line with the nonalignment policy, Afghanistan refrained from attracting 
hostility of China because pro-Chinese instruments were strong enough to start an 
upheaval within the country. Therefore, Podgorny’s visit ended without making any 
agreement except “reaffirming the achievement of security in Asia requires the joint 
efforts of all countries of this area.”211 A historical circle of vicious “being isolated” 
was revealed again for Afghanistan, but this time the Soviet Union estranged in the 
name of playing the balances. 
 
4.1 Mohammed Daoud as the First President of Afghanistan 
 
The year 1973 did not only bring curse on Afghan politics but also it would 
be remembered one of the most depressing years in the world. The decision to 
withdraw the US troops from Vietnam reverberated as an international fiasco, since 
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the US was the first superpower who lost such a small-sized war. In addition to the 
militarily humiliation, the US was shaken by the Watergate scandal in domestic 
politics. Those incidents produced a strong reaction that the US public attention 
focused on “political ethics.” The US stopped interfering remote areas to face her 
own problems, thus the aid that had been given to Afghanistan descended into small 
amounts. 
 
On the other hand, Yom Kippur War, emerged as the greatest Arab-Israel 
War, leaped the tension in the Middle East. In response to the failure of Egypt, Syria, 
and Iraq in the war, Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) put an embargo on exporting crude oil to the countries 
maintaining pro-Israeli politics. Due to the embargo, many oil exporting Arab states 
earned tremendous money from the skyrocketed price, hit the ceiling by %200. 
Again, in 1973, Pakistan, the arch enemy of Afghanistan, divided by two as 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, an opportunity was born to settle the old time accounts like 
Pashtunistan issue and Durrand Line. 
 
It seemed that the world was burning with regional and international crises 
where another evolution/revolution had happened in Afghanistan. While King Zahir 
Shah was on a trip to Italy for a medical treatment for eye problems and therapy for 
lumbago (a kind of back ache),
212
 Mohammed Daoud, with the help of military 
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officers some affiliated with the Parcham faction of the PDPA,
213
 initiated a 
bloodless coup d’état214 on July 17 1973 which led to an exile to King. As soon as, 
Mohammed Daoud seized the power, he abolished the monarchy and introduced 
republic. Actually Mohammad Daoud’s words explained why he made the coup: “I 
have acted to abolish a corrupt and effete government, a pseudo-democracy based on 
personal and class interests which has taken Afghanistan to the edge of an abyss.”215 
 
International reaction to the 1973 coup was fairly positive. The US quickly 
recognized the republic of Afghanistan, gave stronger support more than former 
Afghan governments, by offering more economic aid, especially in the Helmand 
Valley project.
216
 The Soviet Union, too, welcomed the new Afghan republic after 
the coup d’état. The Soviets thought that the role of the PDPA in the coup could 
spread the Leftist tendency first within the army than within the Afghan people. It 
would also generate Soviet sympathizers even though the Marxist-Leninist ideas 
were far from embracing the majority of Afghanistan. Daoud’s collaboration with the 
PDPA in his second era tantalized the Soviets to penetrate the Afghan affairs easily. 
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Kremlin decided to keep her relations at a high level, to infuse the strategic points of 
the ruling mechanism to hoist the red flag on Afghan skies. 
 
Contrary to what the USSR wished for, Western influence, even the US aid 
was decreasing, seemed to be growing. For example, Industrial Development Bank 
of Afghanistan was founded in 1973 in order to allow sponsoring the Western bloc 
including France, Britain, the United States, and Japan.
217
 Besides, western aid, 
having close relations with Middle Eastern countries broadened potential allies of 
Afghanistan as well as they became alternative power centers to the Soviets. 
 
Admittedly, one might question how Daoud was picked as the new leader of 
Afghanistan, who was alienated from the field of politics for consecutive ten years, 
was living his own life refraining from current political debates. Anyhow, recent 
developments in Afghanistan must have encouraged Mohammed Daoud to raise his 
voice against the King, in contrast to his first era as he had made no objection when 
he was requested to resign from his post in 1963. 
 
First of all, Mohammed Daoud had a desire to take the action for more than a 
year 
218
 he just waited for the conditions were matured enough. Prior to his second 
era, he was personally supervising construction of a maternity hospital in Sharara 
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where he was supposed to plan his upcoming reign in details with his “friends.”219 
Setting aside Daoud’s preparation for taking the action, economic reforms of King 
Zahir Shah did not run for the benefit of Afghanistan. In fact, the profit that the 
private enterprise had made; was flowing abroad, especially to Pakistan and Iran.
220
 
No protectionist law was passed for the sake of Afghan local industries and 
commercial men;
221
 therefore Afghanistan became a kind of free market that any 
foreign business man could exploit. 
 
Second, Mohammed Daoud was seen as a hero for his past performance on 
driving the reforms and his utmost efforts to increase the prestige of Afghanistan 
around the world. One can also assert that Mohammed Daoud’s policy on 
Pashtunistan could able to reset the popularity of the monarchy as King Zahir Shah 
pursued a more compromising policy with Pakistan and kept the relations as warm as 
possible. Moreover, Daoud’s commitment to Pashtunistan increased the idea of being 
a nation as well as produced an alternative loyalty to monarchy. 
 
Once the more comprehensive loyalty was obtained via nationalist feelings, 
the less tribal family connections would be the reason for privileges. Daoud also 
preserved his respect to the King and did not plot behind him even after his 
resignation was requested in 1963. His behavior must have deemed very prudent in 
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the eyes of the Afghans that his second era and the way he took the office did not 
cause of a bloody reaction as the whole country was severely polarizing. 
 
Thirdly, when Daoud was Prime Minister, between 1953 and 1963, under the 
tutelage of King Zahir Shah, had limited authority to realize what he planned for the 
future of Afghanistan. He was aware of that a progress was needed to remove the 
democratic difficulties of Afghanistan; thus second era came up with a second 
chance to fix all those problems by Daoud’s methods. So to say, Daoud’s vision and 
state experience, comparing to the Parcham and Khalqi leaders made him the most 
suitable and qualified person. In addition to the qualification issue, Nur Mohammad 
Taraki or Babrak Karmal the leaders of Leftist fractions were highly speculative, and 
their parties did only represent a small portion of the population. Thereto, probably 
none of them would have run the country as smoothly as Daoud could do. 
 
Still, Daoud owed PDPA for the help that they gave during the coup. Daoud 
showed his gratitude by employing a bunch of Parchami sympathizers at state 
departments and taking four Parcham party members into his new cabinet as 
ministers.
222
 The republican, fifty members, Central committee became the supreme 
power body of the state and most of the officers who had taken part in the coup 
found seat in the committee.
223
 After the coup, Parcham remained the only political 
organization working openly; even the Khalqi fraction was better organized in the 
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military and bureaucracy,
224
 when the rest of the political organizations were 
excessively worried about the ambiguity. The Parchamis were so dauntless up to rent 
an office in a hotel named Spinzar at Kabul to operate comfortable.
225
 
 
 Mohammed Daoud chose Parcham for coalition, rather than Khalqi group, 
but this should not be evaluated as an unexpected move. One can assume that 
Parchamis were less radical and their policy making principle based on cooperating 
the current system. Whereas, Khalqis believed the power would come only with a 
sudden revolution. Nonetheless, the coalition was a limited one because the Parcham 
adopted Marxist-Leninist Line, so the leader of Parcham, Babrak Karmal, did not 
want to be remembered as the man who marched for the power through Daoud. Both 
Daoud and Karmal were taking the advantage of the situation until one of them had 
powerful enough to eliminate the other. 
 
Daoud’s cooperation with the Parcham kept the Khalq away from having 
political influence, accessing the important seats in the cabinet as well as broke the 
hopes of recruiting militants from civil and military bureaucracy. However, the 
lesson was learned by the Khalqi leaders: “there was no need to wait until the phases 
of a revolution would blossom or to cultivate the masses for a revolutionary 
conscious. The only thing was needed to penetrate the correct circle of military 
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officers in this manner they would have the equal power that Parchamis had reached. 
Hafizullah Amin was assigned to hire Khalq members within the armed forces.
226
 
 
4.2 Cruelty on Opposition 
 
By the way, to make his second era permanent, Daoud began to dispose his 
old opponents or potential rivals Mohammed Yusuf Abdul Shah Wali and Musa 
Shafiq and Hashim Maiwandal.
227
 However, Hashim Maiwandal’s death, when he 
was waiting for his trial, was announced by the government as a suicide, put an extra 
overshadow on Mohammed Daoud’s regime. After all, the international community 
alleged that there was a government’s finger on the death of Maiwandal228 as the 
interior minister and chief of the investigation commission were controlled by the 
Parchamis. Prior to the 1973 coup, pro-Soviets in Afghanistan had formidable rivals 
from the ultra leftists, to the pro-Chinese Shula-ye Jawid and the ethnic leftist group 
Sitam-i Milli (Against National Oppression).
229
 
 
It was quite understandable that President Daoud decided to liquidate the 
“Opposing Leftists” that was why; he escalated the oppression against the pro-
Chinese and radical left-wing elements. What incomprehensible was Daoud’s rough 
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policies against the Radical Islamist while he was struggling with the Leftists 
simultaneously. Mohammed Daoud obliged the many supporters of “Sitam-i Milli 
Shula-ye Jawid, Hezb-i İslami, Jamiati-i Islami and Harkat-e Islami” 230 fled to 
Pakistan in order to maintain their activities without having any trouble. People, who 
devoted their lives in Islamic principles and insisted on staying in Afghanistan, had 
to pursue their activities through underground movements. Pressure on Islamist 
fundamentalists precipitated the illegal structures within the country which was 
mostly ignored in those days. 
 
By the invitation of the members of the Islamic parties of Afghanistan, 
Pakistan did not propose to protest an unlawful implementation of Daoud’s 
government. To a simple scale, Pakistan was just playing “Islam card” namely; to 
harbor the victims of Daoud’s pro-Soviet regime would dwindle the support that was 
provided by the Moslem World to Afghanistan. It was also alleged that Pakistan also 
furnished military training camps to Afghan dissidents and up to 5000 Afghan 
opponents were trained at secret camps in Peshawar.
231
 
 
Iran, the western neighbor of Afghanistan, was another Middle Eastern, non-
Arab country, benefited from the oil crisis in 1973. To arrive at an economic wealth 
enhanced the self confidence of Iran towards being more active on regional politics. 
The nearest threat to Iranian territorial integrity had double-sides. The growing 
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Soviet influence in the Middle East came to the forefront and Afghanistan stood on 
the trans-passing route. Afghanistan could be used as a military base and an 
intelligence station to infiltrate the Soviet agents into Iranian territory. Albeit, 
Afghanistan was not fully engaged to Kremlin, her pro-Soviet tendency was clashing 
with Iranian interests. 
 
Secondly, Mohammed Daoud’s support on the Pashtun and Baluchi 
irredentists against Pakistan was also seen as a threat to Iran because military 
installations were constructed along southern Iran where Baluchis were living.
232
 
Fragmentation of Pakistan would have galvanized Baluchi and Pashtun minorities 
within Iran ultimately that would also brought about an internal conflict as the 
country was making good money. Therefore, Iran Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza, 
was willing to put an end to the conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan.  
 
To break the Afghan obstinacy, Shah Mohammed Reza decided to deport 
approximately one million Afghan laborers.
233
 What Shah of Iran was trying to do 
was to put an unofficial economic embargo, a kind of intimidation, to the Afghans in 
order to convince them to accept the Iranian demands. Losing their jobs meant for 
the Afghan workers that they were unable to feed their family and on returning 
home, few people would find job and the rest would exacerbate the unemployment 
rate as well as blew the inflation in the country. Extra one million unemployed 
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people were enough to sink the fragile Afghan economy; as a result, probably no one 
ignored the risk of being the burden of such destruction. 
 
To find a middle line, Mohammed Daoud sent his brother Mohammed Naim, 
as the special envoy to Iran. Finally bilateral talks produced positive results between 
Tehran and Kabul. First, in July 1974, Afghanistan signed an agreement with Iran, 
comprising transportation and industrial projects; estimated cost was calculated about 
$1 billion.
234
 In October 1974, the Shah also promised to give extra $2 billion over a 
period of ten years, and concluded an agreement to build a railroad from Kabul to 
Mashhad city.
235
 The rail road allowed Afghanistan to initiate a trade through Iranian 
ports. As a proof of Iranian friendship, “construction of sugar, cement, wood, cotton 
textile, and paper plants were erected in various Afghan provinces, and granted $10 
million credit to the newly established Export Promotion Bank of Afghanistan.”236 In 
order to increase its influence on Tajik population, Tehran Radio started broadcast in 
Dari,
237
 an effective tool for Iranian propaganda, for creating a cultural awareness. 
 
Rapprochement with Iran, and other oil-rich Muslim nations, such as Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait, supplied profound pecuniary resources to Mohammed 
Daoud to run the country. Apart from economic concerns, by establishing close 
relations with Muslim world, Mohammed Daoud tried to erase the accusations of 
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being infidel because his regime was known as pro-Soviet. Daoud’s close relation 
with Kremlin was abused by Pakistan in order to block any potential link between 
Islamic World and Afghanistan. Taking the Arab support would assure the Afghan 
people on how the relations were great with the Islamic world and would disprove 
the Pakistan’s propaganda that Daoud’s regime was pro-Soviet.238 
 
Abrogation of the monarchy neither brought an economic welfare to 
Afghanistan nor did it change traditional bitarafi policy. Despite the fact that Daoud 
began to exercise his reforms such as: nationalization of banks, introduction of fixed 
working hours, amendments in the education system and extended medical care
239
 
living conditions did not improve what it planned. The most important reform 
appeared to be the “land distribution” 240 where a considerable amount of Afghan 
people was living in rural areas. Prolonged dream of building a modern nation stuck 
again to the financial incapability moreover those reforms were met strong 
opposition by the tribal and religious leaders. 
 
President Daoud’s strategy was not different from the strategies of the 
democratization period (1963-1973), he was just struggling for being an impartial 
state by diversifying his allies. Finally, he would be bold enough to generate politics 
freed from Soviet influence. His cooperation with the PDPA was a temporary 
agreement until Daoud consolidated power. Afterwards, he began to dismiss the 
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members of the PDPA from the government. Despite the fact that Mohammed Daoud 
promised a republican administration by taking the basic rights as granted he did not 
propose to share the authority of ruling in fact he was looking forward to cracking 
down the ruling elite according to his own will. 
 
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union worried about the descending role of the 
Leftists in Afghan politics where President Daoud launched a campaign of 
repression. In July 1974, Mohammed Daoud removed two hundred Soviet-trained 
officers and sent some of the communists to foreign services
241
 He was so 
determined on eliminating all fractions of Leftists but he was also so gentle towards 
in the replacement process. Instead of pointing any specific group, he used the 
“corruption and inefficiency”242 card as he explained in a speech “we have no 
connections with any group and linking us to any group or movement is a sin.”243 
 
He put a firm distance between his cabinet and the PDPA by replacing 
Interior Minister, Faiz Mohammed, with a former chief of police Kadir Nuristani 
who was notorious on quelling the Communists.
244
 President Daoud dismissed the 
top military officers from their posts however the rest of the Soviet educated officers 
remained in military so he could not eradicate the roots of the pro-Soviet people. 
Finally, in 1975, Mohammed Daoud declared his initial goal to melt down all 
political parties under his the new politic formation: National Revolutionary Party 
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(NRP). Further he demanded that all the party members join to NRP. That was to say 
Khalq and Parcham would be prohibited from political activities also eradicate the 
hopes of both wings of the PDPA, to become a part of ruling. 
 
While President Daoud had to deal with the problems that were generated by 
Pakistan, he also engaged in removing the remnants of the Leftists from his cabinet 
in 1975. The outcome of having trained the Afghan fundamentalists by Pakistani 
authorities, an insurgency occurred in Panjsher Valley on July 1975.
245
 The 
insurgency did not turn into a general uprising as the rural ulama rejected the call for 
Jihad.
246
 People who were living in rural areas did not interest in whether the 
communists or Islamists had seized the power; because in either way, state policies 
had little or no effect on them.  
 
4.3 The 1977 Constitution of Afghanistan 
 
At home and abroad, Mohammed Daoud was surrounded by the complicated 
issues. Finally, he started to give concessions from his unchangeable politics. In 
1976, Daoud had to stop claiming on Pashtunistan which was his prolonged foreign 
policy objective, made him so popular in his first era. Relaxation in the bilateral 
relations started “when the President of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, offered help to 
the victims of floods and earthquakes in northern Afghanistan which was accepted 
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by Daoud despite the intense pressure on receiving Pakistani aid.”247 Mohammed 
Daoud did not disappoint the goodwill of Pakistan, so the shuttle diplomacy brought 
them closer. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Mohammed Daoud succeed to march towards 
the peace hand in hand. The first sign of improving relations was the acceptance of 
the Durand Line as the international boundary by Afghanistan. In return, Pakistan 
would release the National Awami Party (NAP)
248
 leaders from Baluchistan and 
North Western Frontier Province. 
 
Winds of change encouraged Mohammed Daoud to take fundamental steps in 
domestic politics. In January 1977, he decided to make fresh constitution ratified by 
Loya Jirgah, but he did not allow participation of the PDPA members in the 
constitution process and in serving in the Loya Jirgah.
249
 The new constitution 
included “fundamental economic and social reforms, a land reform, and elimination 
of exploitation in all its forms.”250 The most challenging item in the 1977 
constitution seemed to be the nationalization of the big industries and protecting the 
national resources.
251
 The acts of the constitution underlined that Mohammed Daoud 
did not desist to create a real nonaligned country, no matter how he had good 
relations with imperial or neighboring states. 
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Mohammed Daoud was a typical Asian leader who had his own ways in 
consolidating the power, adding that sharing power meant for him a waste of time in 
building a pretentious state in the region. As a result of his personal ambitions Daoud 
desired to establish one party system led by the Hezb-e-Enqelab-e-Meli (National 
Revolution Party), further he inserted a statement into the constitution which made 
the National Revolution Party as the only party that the progress of the revolution 
could be maintained.
252
 Thus, there would be no objection to Daoud’s decision; no 
opposition could discuss the acts or the order that had brought to the Afghan Council. 
Uniformity in political system without foreign influence was probably the most 
desirable idea of a despotic leader like Daoud but it was also incompatible with the 
Afghan reality. 
 
The 1977 Constitution declared Mohammed Daoud as the unofficial monarch 
of the Afghan state, so to say, for an ordinary Afghan citizen another member of the 
royal family seized the power and dictated his system. His lust for controlling the 
power made him the single man even “no minister was allowed to authorize the 
expenditure of monies above £70 (5,000 Afghanis)” 253 in Afghan state. Nevertheless, 
his nationalist and anti-capitalist policies were design to preserve the neutrality in a 
Cold War environment; his autocratic implementations against all opposition parties 
frustrated the masses; yet the fear that Daoud injected into his people prevented to 
raise their voice. 
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The Afghan reality bitterly showed that Soviet economic and technical 
assistance made possible to build many industrial facilities, energy stations, mine 
pits, infrastructure works, roads, schools, dams, tunnels, and airports until 1977. 
Dependency on the Soviets could be seen also in the foreign politics: “In the United 
Nations, Afghanistan voted regularly either with the Soviet bloc or with the group of 
nonaligned countries.”254 For the sake of détente and Vietnam Syndrome the US 
government did not intend interfering the Soviet-Afghanistan relations. In fact, the 
US foreign department downgraded the mission in Kabul from Class 3 to Class 4, 
which was the lowest category in the State Department’s internal ranking system, 
usually accredited to countries of least importance to the United States.
255
 It was 
publicly announced by the US officials that whether the Soviets had a secret agenda 
or just pursuing a peaceful co-existence, Afghanistan was on the periphery of the US 
foreign politics. 
 
Having stayed with Afghanistan alone in international arena, the USSR had 
words to say about the position of the PDPA and Daoud’s bitarafi politics. The time 
had come with President Daoud’s Moscow visit in April 1977. Mohammed Daoud 
wanted to express his disturbance about the Soviet subversive activities in 
Afghanistan to Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev.
256
 During the talks, Daoud stressed 
on nonalignment of Afghanistan whereas, Soviet delegation praised the collective 
security. It was clear that both sides had different concerns; still a middle way was 
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searching. However, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev brought many critics to the 
Afghan foreign policy: establishing warm relations with Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
and other Muslim nations were the first issue of contradiction. More important than 
that Brezhnev urged that employing foreign experts in Afghanistan, some from North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, did not comport with cordial friendship. Since the 
activities of foreign experts were evaluated by the Soviets as subversive activities 
against Soviet existence. Those experts were the spies of the Capitalist West who 
were undermining the Soviet regime therefore they must immediately deported from 
Afghan lands.  
 
President Daoud’s reply to Brezhnev was equally tough and straightforward: 
“we will never allow you to dictate to us how to run our country and whom to 
employ in Afghanistan. How and where we employ the foreign experts will remain 
the exclusive prerogative of the Afghan state. Afghanistan shall remain poor, if 
necessary, but free in acts and decisions.”257 As soon as Daoud finished his 
statement, he rose from his chair, and the Afghan delegation followed him; in fact he 
refused a private talk with Brezhnev before he flew to Kabul.
258
 The unfinished 
meeting convinced the Soviets that a dream of an obedient Afghanistan might not 
take root unless an alternative leader found instead of President Mohammed Daoud. 
In such circumstances, the Soviets did intensify the efforts to reunify the 
PDPA. According to the Soviets, Mohammed Daoud’s close relation with oil-rich 
                                                          
257
 Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider Account, p. 179. 
258
 Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider Account, p. 179. 
97 
 
Arab countries could not be explained in terms of good neighboring because those 
states had the interests clashing with Kremlin. Still, Mohammed Daoud’s attitude 
could be tolerated if the Leftists had been allowed to be a part of political life. 
Mohammed Daoud became merciless not only to the radical Leftists but also to the 
Parcham and Khalq fractions, Soviet-Afghan relations entered into an irreversible 
phase. 
 
Despite the fact that Parcham and Khalq fractions had not fundamental 
differences, uniting them needed more effort than the expected. Kremlin had already 
prepared her plan-b for the fate of the PDPA. One year before the reunification, Iraqi 
Communist newspaper Tariq Al-Shaab had published the goodness of the 
Communist unity in Afghanistan then the other Moscow-led elements ponder on the 
same propaganda.
259
 On the one hand, Khalq accused Parcham of having 
cooperation with non-Communist but opportunist Mohammed Daoud; on the other 
hand Parchamis allegation was gathered around that Taraki was taking bribes, 
having suspiciously a high private bank account; moreover, he was accused by being 
a CIA agent due to his close ties with the US embassy.
260
 
 
Besides, the allegation on Taraki, being a US agent, Mitrokhin claimed that 
Nur Mohammad Taraki had been recruited in 1951 by the Soviet Secret Service, the 
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KGB, as an agent with the codename NUR.
261
 After Taraki was elected as the first 
secretary of the PDPA in 1965, he was formally removed from the Soviet agent 
network but he maintained to provide intelligence to KGB about the US and Chinese 
activities in Afghanistan.
262
 Intelligence Services do wish to promote their agents’ 
position. Thereto, the agents will occupy more critical position; so the information 
that is collected become more qualified as well as the credibility of the source 
becomes more persuasive. 
 
Although there are many handicaps of collecting information from a 
“strategically infiltrated” agent like Taraki, the most important element is to hide the 
relation between an agent and a case officer.
263
 If the relation is spotted, no matter 
how formidable, none of the secret services could escape from being at the center of 
an international crisis. Once an agent is chosen for a prominent position, the 
intelligence services tend to either cut the relation abruptly or just erase the records 
of the agent and continue the relation via illegal canals which is more dangerous if 
the returns worth for that. 
 
The interesting side of the reciprocal accusations between Parcham and 
Khalq was that leader of Parcham, Babrak Karmal was also recruited as a KGB 
                                                          
261
 Christopher M. Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The world was going our way: the KGB and the 
battle for the Third World, (New York: Basic Books, 2005), p. 386. 
262
 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The world was going our way: the KGB and the battle for the Third World, 
p. 386. 
263
 A case officer is responsible to establish an intelligence network by recruiting agents. The case 
officer leads the agents to collect specific information that cannot be reached by legal or open sources.  
99 
 
agent and with the codename MARID.
264
 Having recruited from both wings the 
Soviets provided a perfect flow of information where the intelligence was double 
checked by different sources. In regards of intelligence, sources from different 
organizations increase the value and reliability of the information. Furthermore, 
Karmal and Taraki were the strongest nominees of presidency for the post-Daoud era 
scenarios. So to say, the Soviets guaranteed that whoever would gain the power 
would no chance but to be an obedient to the Soviets. 
 
Although the moods of the party leaders were too far away from the 
reconciliation, the world-wide Soviet efforts bore fruit, finally in May 1977 Parcham 
and Khalq fractions were united. Nur Mohammed Taraki was elected as the party 
leader and Babrak Karmal as the secretary of the Central Committee. When the 
Parcham and Khalq wings merged under PDPA, intensive efforts were spent by both 
sides for recruiting men from the armed forces. However, Dupree estimated that in 
those days Khalq had some 2,500 followers, Parcham 1,500-2000, and the Maoists 
and Islamists around the same number of followers each.
265
 On the face of it, 
Parcham and Khalq were working together, but each fraction picked military 
adherents separately. 
 
The situation was predictable where the change in the administration was 
imminent; the problem was who would succeed. At first glance, the priority of the 
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Soviet Union was just to remove Mohammed Daoud from his post at any cost; 
otherwise Parcham or Khalqi ruling was nothing more than a simple detail. That was 
why both fractions of the PDPA were supported by the Soviet legal and illegal 
instruments even if they were working independently. By July 1977, the KGB 
residency reported that a struggle for leadership was envisaged “where the PDPA 
cabinet was almost equally divided between the two factions and democratic 
methods had been abandoned.”266 
 
The second era of Daoud was not nurtured in line with the Soviet interests, 
even though the Soviet aid which amounted to 1.5 billion rubles for almost in the last 
two decades,
267
 so to speak, rescued the Afghan economy from bankruptcy. For that 
reason, the Soviets treated the Afghans as if they had own the country; thus they 
thought that all acts and political decisions must be consulted with the Soviet 
advisers. Whereas, many times Daoud claimed that he was not departed from his 
nonalignment policy, to make his effort meaningful he achieved to diversify trade 
and economic sources of money. For instance, Japan came as the Afghanistan’s 
second trade partner just after the USSR in 1978.
268
 As Mohammed Daoud became 
more conservative, more brutal to the Leftists, and struggled to put an end to the 
dependency on the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders hardened the tone of their 
discourses. How much effort Mohammed Daoud spent in establishing close relations 
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with the states other than the Soviet Union, he could not escape to be second largest 
non-communist recipient of Soviet aid during the 1973-1978.
269
 
 
4.4 The Saur Revolution 1978  
 
Rivalry between Parcham and Khalq became complicated after prominent 
Parchamist intellectual Mir Akhber Khyber was assassinated on 17 April 1978. The 
murder of Mir Akhber Khyber, fire from an automatic gun, was the third political 
assassination in the last nine months.
270
 The assassins remained unclear “like the 
killing of a strike leader in August and of the minister of planning in November 
1977”271still Daoud’s secret police and Khalq fraction the most likely suspects. Louis 
Dupree concluded that the murder was directly or indirectly arranged by Interior 
Minister Nuristani who was well-known an anti-Communist statesman told before 
about eradication of the communists before they got too strong.
272
  
 
On 19 April 1978, Mir Akhber Khyber’s funeral brought thousands of 
demonstrators together, the estimated crowd ranged from 10.000 to 30.000.
273
 In 
their speech, both Taraki and Karmal addressed the government was responsible in 
Khyber’s assassination. They asserted that the murder was another step of an 
organized conspiracy which planned by Mohammed Daoud to silence gradually the 
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PDPA.
274
 Afterwards, Daoud took strict measures to prevent the demonstration went 
beyond his control. Thus, On 26 April 1978 a number of leading PDPA figures, 
including Taraki and Karmal were arrested and thrown into prison.
275
 
 
On the following day, on 27 April 1978 a coup took place in the lunar month 
of Saur, therefore, the coup was also called “Saur Revolution.” Abdel Samad Ghaus 
claimed that the officers who made the coup were not more than 800; however, 
neither the Liberals nor the Islamic Fundamentalists were well organized to 
challenge the Leftists in having the power.
276
 At the beginning of the coup, an 
Afghan army unit was sent to Mohammed Daoud’s palace to topple him down. A 
fierce conflict almost took one full night between the insurgents and the guards of 
Daoud (approximately 1.800 men).
277
 At the end of the night, Mohammed Daoud 
and his family were killed after that Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was 
proclaimed and ultimately red flag was hoisted. Nur Mohammed Taraki assumed the 
position of President of DRA, Hafizullah Amin appointed to the Secretary of the 
PDPA, and Babrak Karmal was made Deputy Prime Minister. 
 
The coup was conducted through the coalition between the Leftist army 
officers who mostly educated in Soviet War Academies and the PDPA. Sixty out of 
sixty-two generals removed from the army and replaced by PDPA members 
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promoted from the ranks of colonel or major. Plus nearly quarter of the surviving 
former ministers of the old regime were killed or arrested who were against the new 
regime.
278
 Regarding from the ruling elite, other political groups (Islamists, 
Parchamis, Maoists, members of Afghan Millat)
279
, religious leaders, ethnic groups 
especially the Shi’a Hazaras and Nuristanis (those ethnic groups actively revolted 
against the new regime) and tribal leaders were the victims of the new regime, many 
of them killed, or lost under scrutiny.
280
 The advent of DRA was emerged as a 
regime where a small portion of population with a Communist understanding 
prevailed over the whole country. The old regime possessed the remnants of the 
monarchy but the revolutionary forces of Afghanistan abolished the dynasty and 
initiated a non-elite administration. According to the consideration of PDPA, the 
feudal Afghan society was divided by two: the peasants as the exploited and the 
feudalists as the exploiters. Religion was used to alienate the peasants from pursing 
their actual interests. Therefore, the revolution would give lands to the peasants who 
were the real owners and with a sophisticated education people of Afghanistan would 
wake up from imperialist coma. 
 
As soon as the Khalqi and the Parcham coalition consolidated power, the 
radical Khalqi group began to dominate the government and Parchamis were 
removed from the critical government positions. In July 1978 Babrak Karmal sent 
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into exile as ambassador to Czechoslovakia, later in August 1978, the some 
Parchamis were arrested for plotting a coup and expelled from all Parchami leaders 
from the party and government.
281
 As a result of the recent developments, Nur 
Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin became the two prominent actors in the 
Afghan politics. 
 
Downgraded Soviet-Afghan relations prior to the Saur Revolution began to 
develop in 1978 through the channels of the Defense Ministry, the KGB, the foreign 
ministry, and ministries dealing with economy, trade, construction, and education.
282
 
The Soviet Union was the first country who recognized the new regime in 
Afghanistan. The intention of the Soviets was to establish close relations beyond a 
non-aligned and a super power relation. That was why, Vladimir Kryuchkov as the 
head of the KGB intelligence directorate visited Kabul in 1978 to sign an agreement 
on sharing intelligence and cooperation.
283
 Hundreds of Soviet military and political 
advisers dispatched to Afghan cities to organize secret police networks, army and 
militia units, small factories, and coeducational schools.
284
 Kremlin envisaged a 
slowly revolution progress in Afghanistan where still the class conscious and the rest 
requirements for a socialist state did not exist. 
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The Afghan leaders implemented a quick revolution program which brought 
a set of radical changes in the country; included “redistribution of land, cancellation 
of peasant debts, and the establishment of a large-scale literacy program.”285 Khalqis 
decreed a limit on private property up to six hectares but they could not furnish 
enough seeds, machines credits, or water rights.
286
 What was more important than 
that the gender relations was reorganized by granting equality to women, freedom of 
choice in marriage, and banning child marriages adding that schooling for girls was 
made mandatory.
287
 Larry Goodson has commented “these reforms struck at the very 
heart of the socio-economic structure of Afghanistan’s rural society; indeed their 
sudden nationwide introduction, with no preliminary pilot programs, suggests that 
this was their real purpose.”288 
 
Nur Mohammed Taraki had no intention of tolerating any crack voice against 
the reforms as he said: “Lenin taught us to be merciless towards the enemies of the 
revolution and millions of people had to be eliminated in order to secure the victory 
of the October Revolution.”289 Especially, the uncompromised tactics on the 
religious and tribal leaders which was underestimated by the DRA united the most 
integrated class of the country: the rural people. The Afghan government to stop the 
                                                          
285
 H.Sidky, “War, Changing Patterns of Warfare, State Collapse, and Transnational Violence in 
Afghanistan: 1978-2001,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 41, no. 4 (2007), p. 857. 
286
 Girardet, Afghanistan: The Soviet War, p. 112. 
287
 Sidky, “War, Changing Patterns of Warfare, State Collapse, and Transnational Violence in 
Afghanistan: 1978-2001,” p. 857. 
288
 Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from the Alexander the Great to the fall of the Taliban, p. 
231. 
289
 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The world was going our way: the KGB and the battle for the Third World, 
p. 389. 
106 
 
exploration of the popular uprising bombed the rebel zones especially in rural areas 
where many crops were destroyed in order to starve them.
290
 
 
Naturally, the reforms could not find sufficient support from the majority of 
the population; Afghan government exercised coercive methods even worse than 
Mohammed Daoud had done during 1973-1978. As the situation was going bad to 
worse in Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin gained more important position where he 
was looking for full loyalty to him instead of full loyalty to the system. He then fired 
four cabinet members, Asadollah Sarwari, Aslam Watanjar, Said Mohammed 
Gulabzoi, and Shairjan Mazduryar, who were loyal to Taraki.
291
 Amin spoke in an 
interview about “unity of all Afghans from Oxus to the Indus”292 and further he said 
“We cannot abandon our persecuted brother Pashtuns on the other side of the 
Khyber”293 Since Hafizulah Amin was neither a man who could abandon his 
opinions about nonalignment and independence, nor was he easily be influenced that 
was why, rise of Hazifullah Amin was a serious threat against the Soviets. The KGB 
residency also sent a note to Premier Leonid Brezhnev about Hafizullah Amin in 
November 1978 that Afghan policies were slipping through the USA.
294
 Amin had 
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contacts with the US diplomats but did not give any hint to the Soviet comrades what 
had been talked with them.
295
 
 
For the time being, Amin succeeded to eliminate his opponents from the army 
and the cabinet, there was no considerable opposition to his will. Nur Mohammed 
Taraki was aware of Hafizullah Amin was running for the leadership thus, a plan was 
made to overthrow him. Taraki invited Amin to the People’s Palace to talk about the 
current politics, he refused to meet with Taraki fearing of being executed; soon he 
was persuaded by Soviet ambassador, Alexander Puzanov.
296
 As Amin came to the 
palace, an attempt of murder was directed at him; somehow he escaped without 
taking any injury. In return, controlling the army and the other state bodies 
Hafizullah Amin ordered killing of Taraki on October 1979.
297
 The Soviet sponsored 
plan did not work, so Moscow had to agree with a leader who had suspicious about 
the Soviets and willing to establish good relations with the USA. 
 
A terrible event occurred on February 1979. The Soviet expert US 
ambassador Adoph Dubs was kidnapped by Setam-i Milli members (Maoist group) 
and taken as hostage at Hotel Kabul.
 298
 The aim of the kidnap was to provide 
freedom for the Setam-i Milli members who were in Afghan prisons. Instead of 
negotiating or consulting with the US embassy, President Hafizullah Amin sent a 
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special force unit to rescue the ambassador. The plan was unsuccessful as the 
ambassador, Adolph Dubs, and two of his old kidnappers were accidentally shot to 
death during the operation.
299
 The KGB finger behind the operation was a well 
known fact so to avoid from having any diplomatic crisis between the USA and the 
USSR; the KGB quickly erased their marks in the operation.
300
 Naturally, the US 
outraged to the useless effort to save the ambassador who was a senior diplomat as 
well as an expert on Asian politics. Moreover, the failed operation initiated without 
US consultation. US displeasure came out with the suspending of almost all aid 
programs to Afghanistan.
301
 
 
As the tension was rising in Afghanistan, the massacre at Herat was the 
turning point for the infant DRA regime. None of the Soviet intelligence services or 
the other policy making bodies envisaged the seriousness of the situation while the 
Soviet advisers were still staying with their families as the insurgents were gaining 
more power. In March 1979, Ismail Khan an Afghan army captain called for jihad 
against the Communists and started a rebellion in heavily armed Herat garrison.
302
 
Up to fifty Soviet advisers with their families were killed and the corpses were 
exhibited on the streets.
303
 In the name of taking the revenge, Soviet pilots 
annihilated the historical city of Herat with the massive bombardments Yuri 
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Andropov the chief of the KGB explained the Soviet assault with the words: 
“Bearing in mind that we will be labeled as an aggressor, but in spite of that, under 
no circumstances can we lose Afghanistan.”304 
 
No matter how Hafizullah Amin was crying for Soviet military back up, his 
oppressive policies and brutal social reforms endangered the revolution process; in 
fact the DRA became marginal which failed to accumulate the popular support. 
Without substantial background and visible development program Hafizullah Amin 
sink into a quagmire that no one could save him except the Soviet Union. People 
who saw no future in Afghanistan began fleeing abroad, some to Western Europe 
and Northern America, others to Pakistan to join the Islamic resistance.
305
 The 
Soviets understood that without Soviet military help the Afghan state was on the way 
of fragmentation and to let them being fragmented was equal to permit the 
installation of imperialist states on Soviet borders. The unfinished revolution in 
Afghanistan needed additional force which brought the possibility of intervention on 
the table.  
 
On December 8, 1979, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev arranged a meeting 
with his inner circle: chief of the KGB Yuri Andropov, Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko, Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, and the chief ideologue of the CPSU 
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Mikhail Suslov.
306
 After long time discussions the cadre reached a decision that 
Afghanistan was valuable enough not to be left alone where the hostile states were 
progressing. The first option was to remove Amin with the help of the KGB and 
brought Babrak Karmal to the presidency, second plan was based on sending Soviet 
troops on the territory of Afghanistan for the same purposes.
307
 It was assumed that 
 
stationing the US missiles (Pershing Type) in Afghanistan would threaten 
many vital Soviet objects, including the space center Baikonur the danger that 
the Afghan uranium deposits could be used by Pakistan and Iraq for building 
nuclear weapons; possible establishment of opposition regimes in the 
Northern areas of Afghanistan and annexation of that region by Pakistan, and 
so on.
308
 
 
 
On December 10, 1979, the Defense Minister, Ustinov, informed Chief of 
General Staff, Nikolai Orgakov that a decision was taken to send Soviet troops into 
Afghanistan, and ordered him to prepare approximately 75 to 80 thousand people.
309
 
The Chief of General Staff insisted on that the solution of the Afghan problem 
passed through the political and diplomatic efforts rather than military force.
310
 
Orgakov was unsuccessful to convince the Politburo about the traditional intolerance 
of the Afghan people against the foreign intruders. While the health problems of 
Soviet Premier Brezhnev were so explicit in 1979, the troika (Andropov, Ustinov, 
and Gromyko) was so decisive in sending Soviet troops to Afghanistan. 
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On December 23, 1979, the Kabul residency reported that Amin’s suspicions 
had been aroused both by Western reports of Soviet troop movements and by the 
frequent flights into the Soviet airbase at Bagram. 
On Christmas Day, 1979, as the Soviet 40th Army crossed the Afghan border, 
Soviet invasion had officially started. On 27 December 1979, 700 members of the 
KGB Alpha and Zenith Special Forces dressed in Afghan uniforms and travelling in 
military vehicles with Afghan markings
311
 first stormed President Hafizullah Amin’s 
palace killed him in the shootout then strategic points were seized. In the following 
day, two Soviet motorized divisions crossed the Amu Darya and captured the Salang 
Pass, headed towards Herat, Farah, and Kandahar.
312
 
 
 On December 28, 1979 Babrak Karmal was declared as the new prime 
minister of Afghanistan. The dreadful Soviet army did not have any difficulties since 
the armor units of the Afghan army were demilitarized on the condition of 
“winterization” prior to the invasion so no serious resistance was occurred. However 
such a small invasion for the Soviet Union was not the vital war for them but the 
question must be why the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. 
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4.5 Why Did the Soviets invade Afghanistan? 
 
The main argument of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan mostly 
demonstrated by the Western authors was the aggression of the Soviet Union. This 
argument was fortified by Soviet hostile policy towards Hungry and Czechoslovakia, 
so, Afghanistan was represented as the last victim. Here one makes a distinction 
between the reasons of the invasion: the events that invited the Soviet Union and the 
events that caused the Soviet invasion. “Invitation” is not used as a word to purify 
the Soviets; it is rather a word to suggest that some political decisions have 
unbearable consequences and must be revised before it is too late.  
 
To clarify the “invitation” issue one might assert that no official appeal was 
made for the Soviet troops by the Afghan administration. In some respect, article IV 
of the Afghan-Soviet Friendship Agreement (On December 5, 1978) was illustrated 
as an official right to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan. Article IV stipulated that “In 
the interests of strengthening the defense capacity of the high contracting parties, 
they shall continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of 
appropriate agreements concluded between them.”313 However, the article was so 
open to interpretations. Firstly, “cooperation in the military field” generally 
considered exchanging military personnel, exercising war games, sharing 
technological developments and equipments. No tangible evidence of inviting Soviet 
troops existed in this article; so to speak, this agreement did not justify sending 
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Soviet troops. Many defense agreements had signed during the Cold War and none 
of them clear the guiltiness of the aggressor either for cynical or peaceful means. 
Perhaps, these kinds of agreements persuade the domestic public but one believes 
there is no room for that in international community. 
 
Hafizullah Amin requested Soviet weapons in contrast the Soviets preferred 
to send military personnel because the high-tech machines needed Soviet expertise 
and instructions.
314
 Soviet troops were called in order to put down the insurgencies; 
otherwise none of the president of a country, either independent or client, could 
accept the foreign troops to murder his own people. Sending Soviet weapons also a 
risky act, if the arsenal had been captured by the opposing forces, a greater trouble 
would have been faced. Thence, sending Soviet troops under the command of the 
Soviet generals was probably the best option to stop any further rebellion instead of 
dispatching Soviet weapons. By the way, experiences gained from East European 
invasions (Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968) the operation was 
calculated a short term one as long as Hafizullah Amin was replaced with a loyal 
person, then the Afghan government would work in line with Soviet interests again.  
 
First sign of the invitation was the acceptance of Soviet aids more than any 
other country’s aids. Until the invasion the Soviets invested millions of dollars to the 
Afghan infrastructure, education, and industry. Building dams, mine pits, roads, 
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tunnels, highways, factories, and many facilities became a kind of life belt for 
Afghan economy. Afghan students were accepted at Soviet colleges and universities 
in the USSR by taking unreturned scholarships. Not only in economic terms but also 
in political decisions whenever Afghanistan twisted with the international pressure, 
the Soviet Union appeared as the bystander. In returning the Soviet favor, 
Afghanistan received Soviet advisers who held critical positions in the Afghan state 
cadres. Soviet-Afghan relations were evolving from two equal independent states to 
a manager-client relation. 
 
Traditional balancing policy was not working where the United States lost her 
enthusiasm, towards Afghanistan, especially after the death of venerable ambassador 
Adolph Dubs in a rescue operation in 1979. No rival power left to object the Soviet 
Union, in a relaxed environment Kremlin could impose its plans without 
considerable international pressure. No significant power left in front of the Soviet 
Union to dictate her will to Afghan state. Having excessively close relation with one 
super power without any balancing policy was a great mistake that a state could do. 
 
Installation of Communist regime in Afghanistan facilitated “use of Soviet 
force” according to Brezhnev Doctrine, which allowed the intervention if a socialist 
state was threatened. Actually, Brezhnev did not mention any military solution, he 
just stated “When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of 
some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the 
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country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries.”315 
However, interpretation of his words legitimated Soviet invasions that made the 
Soviet Union as the ultimate protectorate of the socialist regimes. Soviet perspective 
clarified that once a country chose Socialism it would always had to be a socialist 
regime. 
 
Although Saur Revolution in April 1978 was the triumph of the Afghan 
Communists with collaboration of Moscow, the radical reforms and personal 
conflicts made DRA a short term republic. Radical reforms including confiscation 
and redistribution of lands, and freedom to women in social life aroused indignation 
among the rural people. Hafizullah Amin called the Saur revolution a “prolongation 
of the Great October Revolution of 1917.”316 Due to the obsessiveness about making 
a quick reform program in a country where 87 percent of the population was rural, 
the DRA regime faced with strong opposition. 
 
 In 1979 almost % 80 people were living out of urban areas with a high rate of 
illiteracy, so to say, the Afghans were too far away from understanding the very 
basics of a revolution. In such circumstances, the PDPA wanted an abrupt change in 
society but individual ambitions within the party were above socialism. Finally, 
Hafizullah Amin seized the power after having many adventures he then began to 
eliminate Taraki and prominent the party members who he had doubts on their 
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loyalty. Anyhow, Khalqi-Parcham conflict engendered a mass purges, arrests, and 
execution in the country; Amin’s policy left no fundamental adherents to DRA. 
Weakening DRA regime was incapable of settling down the nationwide 
demonstrations, in order to save the infant socialist state, Soviet Union was invited 
by the inaptitude leaders of Afghanistan. 
 
Indoctrination of the Afghan army was another reason of invitation. Merely 
relying on Soviet military resources, Afghan army gained a technological process 
and a better fire power; however Soviet Union via KGB and GRU obtained the 
opportunity to recruit Afghan officers. Those officers were ideologically motivated 
hence the best nominees for high ranks in the Afghan army. Controlling the army in 
third world states like Afghanistan meant controlling the state apparatus; therefore 
the Soviet Union held Afghanistan’s most strategic institution to nurture the seeds of 
socialism. The failure of the Soviet policy was to limit its influence only with Afghan 
military elites, the rest of the people were ignored, and as a result, they joined the 
dissidents’ side during the counter-revolution process. 
 
Third reason as an invitation was the US foreign policy which encouraged the 
Soviets about Afghanistan was under their sphere of influence. The US had never 
been truly interested in Afghanistan; the US, instead of supporting Pakistan in 
international arena, might have stood somewhere in between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. Together with, Watergate Scandal, Vietnam Syndrome, murder of 
ambassador to Afghanistan and the hostage crisis in Iran dragged the US attention 
117 
 
from Afghan affairs. Only in late 1979, US administration focused on Afghanistan 
prior to the invasion, afterwards, the President of the USA, Jimmy Carter approved 
U.S. covert action on July 3, 1979, named “Operation Cyclone” giving aid to the 
Afghan rebels in Pakistan.
317
 
 
Islam presented as the starkest reason of the invasion. In southern borders of 
the USSR, Islam was a sleeping threat to the Soviet existence. It was the most 
binding element for the people regardless of their nationalities or other affiliations. 
Albeit, most diversities were melted down in an ideological spot swarm of 
nationalities and ethnic groups required tight control. Neighbors of Afghanistan, 
except India, shared the same Islamic backgrounds which meant that the Soviet 
Muslims had many opportunities to interact with co-nationals in the Afghan 
population.
318
 
 
A small rebellion, motivated with Islamic notion, within the Soviet Union or 
among the borders, would trigger a domino effect that could eventually bring about 
an unpredictable damage to the Soviet territorial integrity. Soviets perceived that 
their apprehension was not rootless since the US, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
China, Kuwait, and Egypt had been supplying substantial aid to Afghan radicals. 
Actually, the Islamic resistance movement in Afghanistan became noteworthy in 
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1978 when Afghan refugees outnumbered more than 385,000 in Pakistan.
319
 On the 
face of it, Pakistan accepted the refugees who escaped from cruelty of DRA; by 
giving help, Pakistan aimed to distract the Afghans from Pashtunistan issue, pacified 
them in international arena with Islamist guerillas or in other words mujahedeen,
320
 
and halted the incursions of Balushi separatists at Afghan border. Pakistan succeeded 
to turn the Afghan people, via paramilitary training, as a kind of weapon for fraternal 
fight. 
 
Fear of the Islamic insurgency came into existence when Herat witnessed a 
bloody radical uprising against the Soviet advisers and their families. Brutal 
massacre of in Herat outraged the USSR, another reason for invasion, an immediate 
retaliation occurred as the Afghan army destroyed the city. Jalalabad, Asmar, 
Ghazni, Nahrin, and Bala Hisar… one by one Afghan cities jolted with revolts.321 To 
put down the insurgencies, Afghan government became more and more ruthless to its 
people which grew hatred among the Afghan people for DRA.  
Further, Soviet disturbance of Islamic radicals, third reason for the invasion, 
was intensified with the 1979 Revolution in Iran. The fall of pro-US regime in Iran 
did not cheer the Politburo at all. The US lost a staunch ally as well as lost a gate 
opening to deep of Central Asia. On the other hand, the Soviets gained a neighbor 
ruled by Islamic laws; what was important that the new regime in Iran was extremely 
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radical and compromise was out of question. Soviet concern to the Iranian 
Revolution could be analyzed in two categories. 
 
First, the Islamic structure in Iran flared up the worsening situation in 
Afghanistan via calling upon Shiites for rebellion against infidels in Afghanistan. 
Afghanistan had never been a Shiite oriented state, still a considerable amount of 
Shiites were living in the country. Second, strategic location of Iran allowed access 
to warm water ports in Persian Gulf, was a matter of security issue for the USSR; the 
Soviets had no open-sea ports except Murmansk on the Arctic Sea and Vladivostok 
on the east coast, both had to be cleared by icebreakers throughout the winter.
322
 
The Soviets might perceived the US decision to dispatch twenty-one ships 
including two aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea
323
 after the Iranian revolution as an 
intimidation to Iranians and a quick US military built up in the Mediterranean Sea. 
The US lost a strategic ally in the Middle East where the Soviets had good 
connections with Syria, Iraq, and Egypt. Next move of the US could be the assault on 
Iran which would reshape the Afghan borders since the US-led infiltrations could 
able to devastate the incapable DRA regime. Afghanistan, by herself was not ready 
for such spy game confrontations. 
 
In sum, Islamist radicals in Afghanistan exposed the deep fear of a dreadful 
empire, to erase the upcoming threat. First the Soviet Union waited as though the 
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Afghan army could cope with the insurgencies, next to their failure the Soviet 
invasion came to restore the order in Afghanistan. A short term planned invasion 
would endure until another pro-Soviet leader began to float the state. It is quite unfair 
to blame the Soviets that they were purely motivated with territorial ambition; their 
aggression was not more than any other super power. The Soviet Union endeavored 
to enlarge the socialist states around the neighborhood. The bilateral relations 
initiated with mutual understanding at first; later the events which invited the Soviets 
and propelled them to a military solution together precipitated the Soviet invasion. 
Above all, the Soviet Union was a super power which could not tolerate any 
loss of such a small size of war in the heydays of the Cold War. The prestige of the 
USSR could not be tested, if it was questioned, a short term military intervention 
would be inevitable to bring the Afghans to their heels as those kinds of interventions 
worked in the Eastern Europe. Soviets tried to teach a lesson to Afghanistan and to 
intimidate hostile states not to play with their red lines, at the end they were taught 
the lesson that the rest of the great powers learned. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Some states do not lose their strategical importance according to the 
conjuncture; Afghanistan has never been that kind of state whose importance is 
determined by the confrontation of great powers. Instead of having constructed for 
geographic or demographic concerns, borders of Afghanistan shaped as the Great 
Game attributed a special mission to Afghanistan: being a buffer state to fill the zone 
between Russia and Great Britain. While the Russians were slowly advancing 
towards India by digesting Central Asian Khanates, Britain followed the pre-emptive 
war strategy to halt them before they had been a threat to Indian trade routes. Due to 
the Russian-British rivalry in Asia, Afghanistan turned into a highway of invasions 
and incessant armed conflicts. Sometimes being at the center of the international 
politics, sometimes being at the corner; Afghanistan deprived of utilizing the 
industrial and technological developments. 
Independence was assumed not because of erupting nationalistic feelings; in 
fact it was obtained by series of opportunities. The Russian Revolution and 
exhaustion of Britain from fighting allowed Afghanistan to conduct free foreign 
policy as well as establish relations with third states without British permission. 
Declaration of independence did not erase the buffer state status of Afghanistan, 
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adding that lack of having a well built economic structure and trained manpower 
being independent had only a symbolic meaning. Liberated from the British asylum 
in foreign affairs, Afghan domestic resources were insufficient to maintain 
independent policies. 
To break the backwardness, quick modernization programs were introduced 
by the dictation of Afghan kings and presidents who were willing to carry out them 
simultaneously. Instead of gradual innovative programs, accelerated forms of 
development were chosen even if those reforms were highly contradictory to some 
part of the ruling mechanism especially, tribal and religious groups. Those interest 
groups were not eager to lose their influence for the sake of a stronger Afghanistan. 
Admittedly, leaders like King Zahir Shah who was the architect of the first 
constitution, Mohammed Daoud, an idealist in building a modern Afghanistan, also 
perceived that sharing power was a sign of weakness. The 1964 constitution gave the 
authority to the King to assign prime ministers, judges, and high-rank civil and 
military officials. Mohammed Daoud inserted in 1977 Constitution that all political 
parties either to join his party or they would be banned. Whenever a serious 
opposition emerged by demanding more political rights, strict precautions were taken 
by the rulers which culminated in unlawful implementations. None of the reforms 
were able to sink to the level of a standard Afghan citizen where their basic demands 
and traditional sensibilities were ignored. 
Finally, after the Saur Revolution in 1978, Nur Mohammed Taraki followed 
the same oppressing methods in imposing socialist reforms. In particular, segregation 
of women and religious priorities were the vital spots that should not be questioned 
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even by the hegemonic power. Although changes like redistribution of lands could be 
beneficial to the rural people, it was conceived as usurping, khayanat, which was 
against Pashtunwali rules, still regulated the life of Afghan people in 1970s. 
What make the Afghan case interesting is the events after the “Saur 
Revolution.” From 1919 to 1978, Afghanistan was governed by non-communists 
leaders, prior to the coup there was no sign of Soviet aggression. If the Soviet 
expansionism was steady why did they wait for almost sixty years? The Soviet Union 
could not able to consolidate power in the first years of the revolution, but in the 
1950s and later Soviet Union was one of two superpowers of the Cold War. One can 
assume that the Soviet aggression was as equal as the aggression of the USA towards 
third world countries. Superpowers of the Cold War era were codified to spread their 
influence and resist any physical or ideological threat. At first Soviet Union was born 
as a reaction to the existing order of the nation states and their ruling elite, later the 
system created its own elite through politburo, still the Soviet propaganda on regime 
exporting was quite understandable. 
In regards of Afghanistan, Soviet Union did not plan for an immediate 
socialist revolution. Without proper industry, labor class, and ideological conscious, 
no revolution could be sustainable. Detailed intelligence reports and first person 
observations, shared with the Soviet policy makers, made it clear that Afghanistan 
needed progress. On the contrary, Afghan communists applied brutal methods to 
convince the rural people that the best system was the socialist system as if they were 
aware of the different type of administrations. Saur Revolution was the victory of 
minority over majority; therefore it accumulated a coalition consisted of peasants, 
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radical Islamists, conservatives, liberals and even the Leftists. Alienated people were 
motivated by foreign forces like Iran, Pakistan, China, the USA, and Arab countries 
and Islam was used as an antidote of the DRA. 
Rebellious movement blessed with Islam was the heel of Achilles of the 
USSR. It was the strongest incentive for the Soviets to decide a military operation. A 
successful radical Islamic uprising could be contagious for the rest of Central Asia 
where most of their nationalities had organic affiliations with the people of 
Afghanistan. Arabic countries’ blatant financial and emotional support together with 
Pakistan and Islamic Republic of Iran increased the tone of the counter revolutionary 
movements in Afghanistan. Soviet Union invested a considerable amount of aid just 
to drag the Afghans in their side and it seemed that the country was slipping out of 
their orbit. 
Besides Islamic anxiety, strategic concerns and regional balances impelled 
the Soviets to act before it was too late. The invasion was an attempt to rescue 
Afghanistan from falling to the capitalist hands. Applying to military force was the 
last resort of the Soviet Union, but the situation was going out of control from 
Kremlin. Soviet Union had penetrated Afghanistan slowly for more than thirty years, 
which could be assessed a long time, to bring the Afghans on their side at least they 
did it but the internal conflict thwarted a smooth progress. The international reaction 
was relatively insufficient to discourage the Soviet Union to initiative an operation. 
Additionally, the US who did not present noteworthy significance to Afghanistan, 
had to deal with her own foreign policy disputes. Thinking all the events together 
Soviet invasion came as an inevitable consequence. 
125 
 
Soviet Afghan rapprochement was nothing more than the relation of the 
isolated states. Both pursued hostile policies to their neighbors and eventually they 
were forced to embrace each other, it was not a willing but reluctant partnership. 
Afghanistan is a story of prolonged conflicts, and an unsuccessful case of a country 
who struggled hard to make a progress towards somewhere. The Afghans preferred 
to live in a country where their old rules were in current rather than to be dictated a 
set of rules by the foreigners or local rulers. 
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(Source: Heathcote, T., A. 1983. The Afghan Wars 1839-1919. New York: 
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APPENDIX C 
 
SELECTED ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
AFGHANISTAN, 1964 
 
 
Article 1: Afghanistan is a Constitutional Monarchy; an independent, unitary 
and indivisible state. 
Sovereignty in Afghanistan belongs to the nation. The Afghan nation is 
composed of all those individuals who possess the citizenship of the State of 
Afghanistan in accordance with the provisions of the law. The word Afghan shall 
apply to each such individual. 
Article 8:  The King shall be an Afghan national, a Muslim and a follower of 
the Hanafi doctrine. 
Article 9:  The King has the following rights and duties: 
1. Holds Supreme Command of the armed forces of Afghanistan. 
2. Declares war and armistice. 
3. Summons and inaugurates the Loya Jirgah (Great Council). 
4. Inaugurates the ordinary session of the Shura (Parliament). 
5. Summons and inaugurates the extraordinary sessions of the Shura 
(Parliament). 
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6. Dissolves the Shura ( Parliament) and decrees new elections, which 
shall be held with three months from the date of the dissolution of the Shura 
(Parliament). 
7. Signs laws and proclaims their enforcement. 
8. Issues ordinances. 
9. Grants credentials for conclusion of international treaties, in 
accordance with the provisions of the law. 
10. Signs international treaties  
11. Appoints the Prime Minister and accepts his resignation. Appoint 
ministers on the recommendation of the Prime Minister and accepts their 
resignations. 
12. Appoints the non-elected members of the Meshrano Jirgah (House 
of the Elders) and appoints its President from amongst its members. 
13. Appoints the Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme Court. 
14. Appoints Judges and hign ranking civil and military officials and 
grant them retirement in accordance with the provisions of the law. 
15. Accredits the Heads of Afghanistan's diplomatic missions to 
foreign states appoints permanent Representatives of Afghanistan to 
international organizations and accepts the credentials of foreign diplomatic 
representatives. 
 
(Source: 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=af
ghanenglish) 
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APPENDIX D 
 
SELECTED ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
AFGHANISTAN, 1977 
 
 
Article 5: To respect human liberty and dignity and to eliminate all forms of 
torture and discrimination. 
Article 10: To ensure and to generalize compulsory primary education, to 
expand and develop general and vocational secondary education and higher 
education, free of charge, in order to train and form academic and technical cadres to 
serve the people. 
Article 12: To respect the principles of the charter of the United Nations, the 
universal declaration of human rights and to support just peace. Ultimately, the 
formation of a prosperous and progressive society on the basis of brotherhood, 
equality, cooperation, and the preservation of human dignity. 
Article 15: Private property and enterprises, based on the principles of non 
exploitation shall be regulated by law.  
Article 20: Afghanistan is a republican, democratic, independent, unitary, 
and indivisible state. 
Article 21: National sovereignty in Afghanistan belongs to the people. The 
nation of Afghanistan consists of all those individuals who hold the citizenship of the 
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state of Afghanistan in accordance with the provisions of the law. The Word Afghan 
shall apply to each and every individual of the Nation of Afghanistan. 
Article 22: The religion of Afghanistan is the sacred religion of Islam. Those 
citizens who are not followers of Islam shall be free to perform their religious rites 
within the limits determined by the laws relating to public decency and public peace. 
Article 38: Freedom of thought and expression are inviolable. Every afghan 
has the right to express his through speech, writing, pictures, or similar means, in 
accordance with the provisions of the law. Permission and the right to establish 
printing houses, and issue publications, shall be granted only to citizens of 
Afghanistan in accordance with the provisions of the law. The establishment of large 
Printing houses and the establishment and operation of public Radio and television 
transmitters are the exclusive right of the State. 
Article 40: For the reflection of social demands and for the political 
education of the people of Afghanistan, until such time as this aspiration is realized 
and attains its natural maturity, the one party system led by the hezb-e-enqelab-e-
meli national revolution party), which is the founder and vanguard of the popular and 
progressive revolution of saratan 26, of the Year 1352 of the people of Afghanistan, 
will prevail in the Country. 
 
(Source: http://www.afghangovernment.com/Constitution1976.htm) 
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APPENDIX E 
 
TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN 
ALEXEI KOSIGIN AND NUR MOHAMMED TARAKI (17 or 18 MARCH 
1979) 
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(Source: http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/soviet.html) 
 
